Source — AITW Ep004: Change at the Top; Huawei and 5G; PM Morrison to Indonesia¶
Metadata¶
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Episode | 4 |
| Title | Change at the top; Huawei and 5G, PM Morrison to Indonesia |
| Publication date | 2018-09-06 |
| Speakers | Allan Gyngell, Darren Lim |
| Guest | None |
| Duration | ~37 min |
Summary¶
Two things stand out in this episode as biographical evidence about Allan. The first is his equanimity about political turbulence. When asked how the Turnbull-to-Morrison transition affects Australian foreign policy, he refuses to be alarmed. The Canberra chaos is, at most, "a nasty boardroom fight — or maybe that should be a nasty bar room fight." Australia's underlying foreign policy consensus is bipartisan, structural, and durable; individual prime ministers change the emphasis and the execution, not the frame. His confidence in that structure is not complacency — it is the product of decades inside the system. He knows how robust the policy machinery is precisely because he has worked it.
The second is his account of Julie Bishop. Allan was at the Lowy Institute in 2009 when Bishop — days after leaving the Shadow Treasurer role — turned up to a seminar on Australia's South Pacific relations. She was "asking good questions, taking copious notes" and Allan was "really impressed." The detail is characteristic: he forms his judgements about people early and from specific, observed behaviour, not from reputation. His verdict on her legacy is equally precise — "there will be a Bishop legacy but not a Bishop doctrine" — and the distinction matters to him. She was a superb problem-solver. But problem-solving is not the same as strategic architecture. He holds both assessments simultaneously, adding immediately that the decline in the aid budget to "historic lows" is a legacy she cannot avoid. The praise and the critique arrive in the same breath.
The Huawei discussion reveals Allan's clearest articulation of the limits of political understanding in complex technical decisions. He notes, without apparent surprise, that cabinet ministers "conceded they did not understand the complex technology but were happy to be guided by security agencies." His analysis of why this is structurally difficult — that risk tolerance for security agencies is always low, and that politicians cannot calibrate risk they cannot understand — is the observation of someone who has sat in enough secure rooms to know how decisions actually get made. "Decision making in government is like decision making everywhere," he says. "It can certainly swing on the personalities involved and on the arguments that are made on the day and the whole range of other human foibles on which decision making rests." It is a sobering sentence, quietly delivered. The episode closes with Allan recommending a Foreign Correspondent segment on Sean Dorney, the veteran PNG journalist then seriously ill — described as "a really moving tribute." The choice of word is revealing: Allan is not embarrassed by sentiment when it is warranted.
Key Topics¶
- Leadership change: Turnbull → Morrison, Bishop → Payne
- The NSC and its institutional history (John Howard, 1996)
- Huawei/5G decision: technology complexity vs. political understanding
- Australia-Indonesia CEPA and its limitations
- Morrison skipping APEC/EAS (Trump's decision; Pence substitution)
- Julie Bishop's legacy
Key Quotations¶
On leadership change and foreign policy continuity¶
"The essential bipartisanship at its centre and the continuity between different governments... there wasn't much in the government's foreign policy white paper with which the opposition has shown any disagreement at all, the Alliance, the importance of the Indo-Pacific region, our role in the South Pacific, commitment to the rules-based order."
— Allan Gyngell [00:04:01.300 --> 00:10:00.300]
"I don't think that that many people outside diplomatic circles have noticed to be frank and B, it's a manifestation of a robust democratic system. So it's not a coup so much as a nasty boardroom fight or maybe that should be a nasty bar room fight... Our reputation will survive this. We just shouldn't keep on doing it."
— Allan Gyngell [00:04:01.300 --> 00:10:00.300]
Dry and direct: "nasty bar room fight" for what the media was calling a political crisis. Calibrated perspective; refuses to overstate.
On Julie Bishop (with personal recollection)¶
"I was at the Lowy Institute and it was 2009 and we were holding a day-long seminar in Sydney on Australia's relations with the South Pacific... she was asking good questions, taking copious notes so I was really impressed... she will be remembered very well I think."
— Allan Gyngell [00:11:00.300 --> 00:13:03.300]
"Everyone has said she was an enormously hard working minister and one of the most effective that we've had... she regarded her job I think as one of solving problems rather than creating conceptual frameworks... there will be a Bishop legacy but not a Bishop doctrine... Apart from the decline in the aid budget to historic lows which is a legacy I don't think she can avoid."
— Allan Gyngell [00:11:00.300 --> 00:13:03.300]
Important distinction: "legacy" versus "doctrine." Allan reserves "doctrine" for a deeper conceptual coherence; Bishop was an effective problem-solver but not a strategic thinker in that sense. The aid budget criticism is frank and consistent with his recurring concern about underinvestment in soft instruments.
On the NSC (National Security Committee of Cabinet)¶
"The National Security Committee of Cabinet was an innovation introduced by John Howard when he came to power in 1996... It brought together a number of the key national security agencies as well as Treasury in order to give an economic perspective... NSC meets in a secure facility, secure room and telephones have to be handed in at the door and much of its work is highly classified."
— Allan Gyngell [00:17:03.300 --> 00:19:02.300]
Shows deep institutional knowledge of how Australian government actually works — a practitioner's knowledge that distinguishes him from academic commentators.
On the limits of political understanding of technology¶
"I did think that one of the most interesting parts of Jennifer Hewitt's reporting on this was her line that other Cabinet ministers had conceded they did not understand the complex technology but were happy to be guided by security agencies... It's hard for politicians accurately to judge the risk they're prepared to take if they can't understand the underlying science and technology."
— Allan Gyngell [00:20:53.950 --> 00:22:17.300]
"Decision making in government is like decision making everywhere. It can certainly swing on the personalities involved and on the arguments that are made on the day and the whole range of other human foibles on which decision making rests."
— Allan Gyngell [00:20:53.950 --> 00:22:17.300]
A realistic and somewhat sobering view of governance: "human foibles" shape decisions that appear systematic and rational.
"There's certainly an argument for wishing that there were more scientists and people with STEM backgrounds in Parliament."
— Allan Gyngell [00:23:14.110 --> 00:24:08.990]
On trade agreements¶
"Here we are sitting in the Crawford School and surrounded by rampaging economists. So I've learned that we need to think about these things as preferential trade agreements rather than free trade agreements... How much weight free trade agreements build into a relationship is not that clear to me."
— Allan Gyngell [00:30:16.500 --> 00:31:20.940]
Self-deprecating humour about economists; scepticism about the political weight of trade agreements.
On Trump skipping regional summits¶
"It's a really disappointing decision on President Trump's part... It reinforces the growing tension between the sort of language being used in documents like the National Defense Strategy and the actual actions of from the TPP and his treatment of Japan and South Korean allies at different times."
— Allan Gyngell [00:32:36.860 --> 00:34:39.820]
Identifies the contradiction between hawkish US strategic documents and Trump's actual disengagement from the region. A consistent line of analysis.
Watching Recommendation¶
Allan recommends an ABC Foreign Correspondent segment featuring Sean Dorney (veteran PNG journalist, then seriously ill):
"It's a really moving tribute to one of the great Australian journalists and a reminder of about Julie Bishop, this was one thing that she really understood."
— Allan Gyngell [00:35:43.730 --> 00:36:51.730]
Reveals: Allan watches quality long-form journalism; values it as evidence of political understanding (linking Dorney's PNG work to Bishop's comprehension of the relationship). Emotional register: "really moving."
Evidence Relevant to Allan's Views¶
- Leadership changes matter less than the underlying policy continuity; bipartisan consensus is the structural reality
- Bishop was a superb problem-solver but not a strategic doctrine-builder
- The aid budget decline is a genuine black mark on Australia's foreign policy record (applies to both sides)
- Government decision-making is shaped by "human foibles" — personalities and arguments on the day — not just rational strategic calculation
- STEM literacy is needed in parliament for complex technology decisions
- Trade agreements often serve as "signal-sending" rather than transformative tools
Evidence Relevant to Allan's Style and Persona¶
- "Nasty bar room fight" — prefers vivid, deflating language to euphemism
- Shares personal recollections that are both relevant and affectionate (Bishop at the Lowy seminar)
- Precision: "legacy" vs. "doctrine" — insists on conceptual distinctions that others elide
- Self-deprecating: "surrounded by rampaging economists"
- Emotional: "really moving" in response to a journalist's story about PNG
Biographical Fragments¶
- Observed Julie Bishop at a Lowy Institute seminar on the South Pacific in 2009
- Is clearly embedded in the Canberra policy/academic network (Lowy, Crawford School, AIIA)
- Is interested in quality television journalism (ABC iview, Foreign Correspondent)
- Victoria is his home state (confirmed in Ep008)
Characteristic Phrases¶
- "A nasty boardroom fight or maybe that should be a nasty bar room fight"
- "A Bishop legacy but not a Bishop doctrine"
- "Human foibles on which decision making rests"
- "Surrounded by rampaging economists"
Relevance to Central Biographical Question¶
Allan's ability to say frank things about politicians from both sides — praising Bishop while holding her to account for the aid budget; laughing at the domestic political chaos — gives him the appearance of a genuine independent. His practitioner knowledge of the NSC and government decision-making is on display; he speaks not as an outsider theorising but as someone who knows how these rooms work. His emotional response to Dorney's documentary suggests that good journalism about Australia's neighbourhood matters to him — not just strategy papers.
Open Questions¶
- Does Allan's view of the NSC's role in the Huawei decision prove accurate?
- Is Morrison's visit to Indonesia the beginning of a sustained Indo-Pacific engagement or a one-off?