Source — AITW Ep026 — AUSMIN; Hastie Op-Ed; HK Protests; Pacific Islands Forum¶
Episode Metadata¶
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Episode number | 26 |
| Title | Ep. 26: AUSMIN; Hastie op-ed; HK protests in Australia; Pacific Islands Forum |
| Publication date | 2019-08-21 |
| Guests | None (Darren and Allan only) |
| Allan present | Yes |
| Format | Four-topic news analysis: AUSMIN, Hastie op-ed, HK protests in Australia, Pacific Islands Forum; reading segment |
Summary¶
Dense four-topic news analysis recorded 19 August 2019. The topics are: the 29th AUSMIN consultations in Sydney; Andrew Hastie's Maginot Line op-ed and the economist-vs-security fault line it exposed within the Liberal Party; Hong Kong-related protests on Australian soil; and the Pacific Islands Forum in Tuvalu, where Morrison held firm on coal against Pacific climate pressure. The reading segment contains the most significant biographical fragment in the episode: Allan was working on the Soviet Union in ONA when Chernobyl exploded in April 1986, giving the first evidence of an early ONA posting as an analyst — separate from and decades before his later ONA Director-General role.
Key Quotations¶
"The phantom at the back of every paragraph"¶
"Apart from the reassertions of the importance of the alliance, which are a permanent element of these statements, it looked like such a different world [compared to 2014]. The statement is much broader in its international range. And the big difference is the way China now pervades the entire statement while hardly being named at all. I think there are only two references to China in it, but it's the phantom at the back of every paragraph."
— [00:04:15.140 --> 00:05:20.140]
A precise and vivid analytical image. "Phantom at the back of every paragraph" captures how diplomacy works: the named party is often not the real subject. Allan's method here — going back five years and comparing — is characteristic. The 2014 AUSMIN also mentions climate change and international trade; 2019 drops them. The absence is as telling as the presence.
Morrison's clarity on missiles — "don't ask"¶
"He could have taken refuge in the line that we've had no request and we wouldn't make a decision until then or some other weasel words. But he said very directly, and I'm quoting him, that's not something the government would consider. I think I can rule a line under it. Now, that seemed to be a pretty clear message to Washington, don't ask."
— [00:10:41.140 --> 00:11:24.140]
Allan reserves credit when it is due. "Weasel words" is named as the alternative — the default evasion a politician might reach for — before noting Morrison chose directness instead. "Don't ask" is Allan's distillation: one of his most compressed analytical judgments in this episode. He notices the pre-emptive nature of Morrison's statement.
"Coercion is a permanent feature of international politics"¶
"You know my position on coercion, Darren. I think it's a permanent feature of international politics. China does it a lot, and so does the US."
— [00:13:00.140 --> 00:13:47.140]
"You know my position" — signals a settled analytical stance, not a fresh response. Coercion is not an aberration from normal diplomacy; it is diplomacy. The equivalence (China does it, so does the US) is characteristic anti-binary thinking: the question is not whether coercion is happening but whether Australia is handling it well. He then adds: "I think it could have been done better. Soybeans was hardly the most relevant example for an Australian audience."
On the Hastie op-ed: the straw man on democratisation¶
"I think this is a straw man. I know many Australians, officials and politicians, who have worked in and on China over the past 30 years. And I simply don't know any who saw a straight line between economic liberalisation and democratisation. It was always clear that the Communist Party was working as hard as it could to shore up its own legitimacy by associating itself with economic growth."
— [00:22:47.140 --> 00:25:41.140]
Allan's most substantive criticism of the Hastie piece. He does not dispute the concern about China; he disputes the historical claim on which the Maginot Line analogy rests. The people he actually knows — officials, politicians, practitioners — held a more nuanced expectation: not democratisation, but expanded personal space for individual Chinese citizens. That is what happened. The straw man is the simplification required to make the analogy work.
"I'm always wary of historical metaphors"¶
"I'm always wary of historical metaphors, whether it's Thucydides and Sparta and Athens or Munich or the Maginot Line. And for any of our listeners who are interested in the subject, I suggest for them and for all our parliamentarians and public servants, the classic book, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-makers by Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, both from the Kennedy School of Government."
— [00:22:47.140 --> 00:25:41.140]
A direct statement of one of Allan's most consistent methodological positions. Historical analogies are seductive but dangerous — they invite false pattern recognition. He is not anti-historical (history is his primary analytical resource), but he distrusts the rhetorical use of a single historical metaphor to close down analysis. Recommends Neustadt and May as the antidote: a book precisely about how to use history well in decision-making. The recommendation is addressed explicitly to "parliamentarians and public servants."
Chernobyl watching — and the ONA revelation¶
"I was working on the Soviet Union in ONA when the explosion occurred, and I can still remember our efforts to try to work out what was happening. In some ways, as Kyle Gorbachev acknowledged later, the accident and the crime that followed represented the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The series is devastating to watch with accounts of some astonishing personal heroism by those who were responding on the ground and appalling cowardice by many of their bosses. If you want a perfect example of the consequences and dangers of authoritarian systems and the absence of free press, it's all there."
— [00:45:12.140 --> 00:46:15.140]
The most significant biographical disclosure of the episode. "I was working on the Soviet Union in ONA" in April 1986 — when Chernobyl exploded — places Allan as an ONA analyst in the 1980s. This is a distinct posting from his later Director-General role (confirmed as overlapping with 2011–2014). He was watching Chernobyl unfold in real time from ONA and "trying to work out what was happening" — the intelligence analyst's task. His emotional engagement with the series ("I can still remember") reflects the professional memory, not just the historical interest. The recommendation itself — "if you want a perfect example of the consequences and dangers of authoritarian systems and the absence of free press, it's all there" — is Allan at his most policy-pedagogical: a TV series as argument.
Pacific: "big guy on the Pacific block"¶
"Australia is the big guy on the Pacific block, and to some extent, we're always going to be a convenient target of criticism for the smaller states. That just goes with our size. And our New Zealand friends, I have to say, have been known to take advantage of this for their own purposes from time to time."
— [00:39:36.140 --> 00:41:44.140]
Wry but structurally correct. The NZ dig — "our New Zealand friends... have been known to take advantage of this" — is delivered lightly but is a genuine analytical point: NZ positions itself as the more sympathetic partner by letting Australia absorb the criticism of size and policy. "For their own purposes from time to time" is the key qualifier: not malice but structural incentive.
Coal exports and the Pacific — the irony¶
"Although, Darren, a lot of the coal-generated electricity in China is a result of the Australian coal exports."
— [00:43:10.140 --> 00:43:18.140]
Nine words, timed perfectly after Darren notes that Pacific Island Forum countries are less inclined to call out Beijing on climate. Allan's interjection turns the framing: Australia's coal exports feed Chinese generation, so the China/Australia emissions comparison Darren sets up is more entangled than it appears. Characteristic precision: not an argument, just the correct complication.
Biographical Fragments¶
Evidence type: Confirmed — MAJOR DISCOVERY
- Allan was an ONA analyst working on the Soviet Union in April 1986 (Chernobyl) — "I was working on the Soviet Union in ONA when the explosion occurred, and I can still remember our efforts to try to work out what was happening." This is the first evidence of an early ONA posting as an analyst. Combined with the later DG role (confirmed overlapping with Symon's 2011–2014 DIO tenure), Allan had two distinct periods at ONA: as a Soviet analyst in the mid-1980s, and as Director-General decades later. (Ep026)
Career arc update: The 1986 Soviet analyst role likely sits within the 1983–1991 PM&C/Hawke government window, or possibly before. Allan was in PM&C "in Hawke's department" (Ep020), but the ONA analyst role may have been a separate posting during the same era. It is possible he moved between ONA and PM&C during the Hawke years — not uncommon in the national security community. Alternatively, the ONA Soviet analyst role may have preceded his PM&C posting.
Style and Method Evidence¶
- Comparative method: Goes back five years to compare 2014 and 2019 AUSMIN statements. This is his standard move — establish the baseline before assessing the change.
- "Phantom at the back of every paragraph": One of his most vivid analytical images in the corpus; captures how diplomatic documents encode what they cannot name.
- Pre-emptive credit: Praise for Morrison's directness on missiles — "he could have taken refuge in weasel words." Allan is not aligned with the government, but names good conduct when he sees it.
- The straw man named and demolished: On Hastie — not angry, just precise. The democratisation claim is false as a description of what practitioners actually believed; the analogy collapses without it.
- Historical metaphor caution: Explicitly and methodologically stated. The Neustadt/May recommendation is an analytical programme, not just a book tip.
- The interjection on coal: Nine words, perfect timing, turns the frame. Characteristic economy of expression.
Reading, Listening and Watching¶
Allan — HBO Chernobyl (2019, dir. Johan Renck)
"I was working on the Soviet Union in ONA when the explosion occurred... The series is devastating to watch with accounts of some astonishing personal heroism by those who were responding on the ground and appalling cowardice by many of their bosses. If you want a perfect example of the consequences and dangers of authoritarian systems and the absence of free press, it's all there. I can't recommend it highly enough."
Allan's television recommendation carries autobiographical weight he does not make explicit but is visible: he watched Chernobyl unfold as an intelligence analyst in 1986, and is now watching it dramatised 33 years later. He ends with "I can't recommend it highly enough" — his strongest recommendation endorsement in the corpus to this point.
Allan — Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-makers (Free Press, 1986)
"For any of our listeners who are interested in the subject, I suggest for them and for all our parliamentarians and public servants, the classic book, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-makers."
Recommended in the context of the Hastie Maginot Line analogy. Neustadt and May's argument is that history must be used carefully, comparisons must be tested, and the disanalogies matter as much as the analogies. Allan's recommendation addresses politicians and public servants directly — this is a prescribed text for the people making Australia's foreign policy.
Open Questions¶
- Was Allan's 1986 ONA Soviet analyst role continuous with his Hawke-era PM&C work, or a separate prior posting? The 1983–1991 Hawke period covers both, but ONA is a separate agency from PM&C.
- Did he move between ONA and PM&C during the Hawke years, or was the Soviet analyst role in a different period?
- Does he return to Chernobyl or Soviet Union analysis in later episodes — given how personally he engaged with the series?