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Source — AITW Ep103 — Nuclear Escalation; UNGA Meetings; Track 1.5s

Episode Metadata

Field Value
Episode number 103
Title Ep. 103: Nuclear escalation; UNGA meetings; Track 1.5s
Publication date 2022-10-05
Recording date Wednesday, 28 September 2022
Guests None (Allan and Darren only)
Allan present Yes
Format News episode: Russia-Ukraine nuclear escalation risks; Penny Wong's UNGA speech; Track 1.5 dialogue on Australia-Thailand. Reading segment at close.

Summary

A moderate biographical yield built around three distinct strands. First, Allan discloses recent personal participation in a Track 1.5 dialogue on Australia-Thailand relations, chaired by him on the Australian side, convened by the Asia Foundation and the ANU's Coral Bell School. This is not a generic endorsement of Track 1.5 processes — he is describing something he personally led, with specific outcomes (bilateral agenda on trade, energy and climate; frank exchanges on China and Myanmar; Australian visa bureaucracy criticised). Second, listening to Darren's analysis of nuclear deterrence, he positions himself as a Cold War practitioner who remembers the weight of thinking that went into these questions: "how much evident, serious thought in government and academia over a period of 30 years went into the question of Nuclear deterrence and the management of escalation ladders." Third, he groups Russia's Ukraine invasion alongside the American invasion of Iraq and Brexit as "those other 21st century strategic catastrophes" — a striking analytical triad that reveals his framework for judging strategic failure.

The episode also contains one of Allan's finest wry exchanges. He confesses to Darren: "I could tell when I first raised this, Darren, that you thought that the subject fell somewhere on the spectrum between unexciting and tedious." Darren protests. Allan: "I know what I heard." And later, when Darren suggests someone should build a model of Track 1.5 diplomacy, Allan's instant response — "We're waiting" — is one of the driest single-line deliveries in the corpus.

Key Quotations

"Those other 21st century strategic catastrophes"

"It certainly reinforced my view that the decision to go into Ukraine was a disaster for Putin alongside those other 21st century strategic catastrophes of the American invasion of Iraq and the Brexit decision."

— [00:03:13.730 --> 00:04:09.270]

Three decisions grouped as a triad: Russia into Ukraine, America into Iraq, Britain into Brexit. What unites them, in Allan's framework, is that all three were strategic errors of the first order — catastrophes in the sense of decisions that produced consequences vastly worse than the alternatives available. The grouping is deliberately provocative: Brexit sits alongside military invasions. This is his structural mode: he is not making a moral equivalence but an analytical one about the quality of strategic decision-making. "I certainly can't predict what's going to happen" follows immediately — the verdict on the past is confident; the prediction of the future is restrained. He reads Gideon Rachman of the FT, describes him as "not a writer given to hyperbole," and endorses Rachman's verdict that outcomes range "between bleak and catastrophic." Allan's own forecast: unknowable, but the informed commentators are grim.

"As someone who remembers the Cold War" — professional nuclear memory

"Listening to your comments was a reminder to me as someone who remembers the Cold War how much evident, serious thought in government and academia over a period of 30 years went into the question of Nuclear deterrence and the management of escalation ladders. And as you demonstrate, we urgently need to think about and debate these issues again for a new era."

— [00:11:46.130 --> 00:12:17.630]

"As someone who remembers the Cold War" — not as a civilian bystander but as a professional who worked through it. He was a Soviet analyst at ONA in the mid-1980s and in senior intelligence and policy roles throughout the Cold War's final decade. The phrase "in government and academia" pairs the two worlds he inhabited across his career. His observation is precise: the problem is not just that the nuclear question has returned, but that the enormous body of accumulated thinking about deterrence, escalation ladders, and crisis management that was developed across thirty years of Cold War is not being drawn on. "We urgently need to think about and debate these issues again for a new era" is both a policy call and a practitioner's frustration — he lived through the investment in that thinking and he sees it being squandered.

The Australia-Thailand Track 1.5 — "identifying fresh areas of opportunity"

"I was invited by the organizers of a dialogue to strengthen the relationship between Thailand and Australia to be the chair, I guess, of the Australian delegation matching a distinguished former Thai official who is now a senator... These things only work if you have the right people on both sides, and that means diverse, knowledgeable individuals with a good range of experience. And in this case, the ambassadors from both countries participated along with some very senior current officials... One of the outcomes for me, anyway, was the multilateral, not just regional... one of the jobs of foreign policy is to identify fresh areas of opportunity."

— [00:33:48.510 --> 00:37:38.510]

The disclosure is specific: he chaired the Australian delegation; it was organized by the Asia Foundation (Bangkok) and the Coral Bell School at ANU; the Thai counterpart was a former official now in the Thai senate. His account of what worked — "the right people on both sides" with "diverse, knowledgeable individuals" — and what outcomes emerged (bilateral agenda on trade, energy, climate; frank discussion of China and Myanmar; an unexpected critique of Australia's visa bureaucracy) is the practitioner's debrief, not the diplomat's public statement. "These sometimes work well and sometimes turn out to be pretty pedestrian" is the seasoned qualifier: he has done many of these, and he is being honest about the variation. "One of the jobs of foreign policy is to identify fresh areas of opportunity" is his summary of what Track 1.5 processes do at their best.

"I know what I heard" — the wry-but-firm register

"I could tell when I first raised this, Darren, that you thought that the subject fell somewhere on the spectrum between unexciting and tedious." "I think you're projecting." "I know what I heard."

— [00:33:48.510 --> 00:34:00.510]

A small but characteristic exchange. Allan calls out Darren's polite scepticism, Darren deflects, Allan holds his ground with three words. The timing is perfect — no elaboration, no hedging, no softening. "I know what I heard" is the confident, slightly amused close. It is also revealing: he is not annoyed, and he does not drop the subject. He uses the ribbing as an entry point for why the subject is worth discussing, then delivers a detailed and convincing account. The comedy is in service of the argument.

Biographical Fragments

New

  1. Chaired Australian delegation at Australia-Thailand Track 1.5 dialogue — organized by the Asia Foundation (Bangkok) and the ANU Coral Bell School; matched against a "distinguished former Thai official who is now a senator." Specific outcomes: bilateral agenda on trade, energy and climate; frank discussions on China and Myanmar; Australian visa bureaucracy criticised. (Ep103)

  2. Cold War nuclear deterrence as professional memory — "as someone who remembers the Cold War" — positions himself as someone who worked through the accumulated thinking on nuclear deterrence in government; ONA Soviet analyst period is the most likely locus. (Ep103)

  3. Reads Gideon Rachman (FT) regularly — quotes him this morning; describes him as "not a writer given to hyperbole" — the qualifier of trust. (Ep103)

Reinforcing

  1. "In my experience over the years" on Track 1.5 dialogues — confirmed extensive personal participation in such processes across his career. (Ep103)

  2. Lawrence Freedman and Mick Ryan as authoritative Ukraine commentators — named alongside each other; consistent with Freedman recommendation in Ep095. (Ep103)

  3. H.V. Evatt recalled instantly — knows Australian foreign policy history deeply enough that Evatt's San Francisco conference role is immediate reference material. (Ep103)

Style and Method Evidence

  • "We're waiting": when Darren says someone should build a model of Track 1.5 diplomacy; single-line, perfectly timed, not cruel.
  • "Those other 21st century strategic catastrophes": Iraq, Brexit, Ukraine — a triad that reveals his framework for assessing strategic failure independent of ideology.
  • "Not a writer given to hyperbole": the qualifier that signals trust in a source — used for Rachman; consistent with how he signals endorsement vs. provisional citation.
  • Track 1.5 as practitioner's genre: he knows the difference between pedestrian and productive; specific outcomes matter; the right people on both sides is the critical variable.
  • "The treasure is really at the end": on the Quarterly Essay — identifies the Hugh White responses as the primary value, not the Daly/Stevens essay itself.

Reading, Listening and Watching

Allan — Quarterly Essay: Uncivil Wars (Wally Daly and Scott Stevens) with Hugh White responses

"An easy winner this week. The latest quarterly essay, Uncivil Wars... is an important read in its own right. But for this podcast's purposes, the treasure is really at the end in the replies to Hugh White's Sleepwalk to War essay... His now extensive body of writing on Australia's response to China's rise and the challenge to American hegemony in Asia has certainly been an important contribution to the Australian debate. And the quarterly essay... has now assembled a really stellar group of people to respond to Hugh's challenges."

— [00:39:27.110 --> 00:41:14.510]

"An easy winner this week" — rare phrase; Allan usually works harder to justify his recommendations. The enthusiasm is genuine: the format of the Quarterly Essay exchange — a clear argument, then a collection of serious respondents, then a reply — is precisely the kind of structured intellectual debate he values. He lists the respondents by category (politicians, practitioners, academics, non-Australians, non-establishment voices) which shows he is reading the collection as a landscape of perspectives, not just individual pieces. "Calm, thoughtful, well mostly calm and thoughtful" — the self-correction in brackets is characteristic wit.

Open Questions

  1. Does Allan describe the Australia-Thailand Track 1.5 elsewhere in the corpus, or is this the only episode? Are there other Track 1.5 or Track 2 processes he has participated in that he mentions?
  2. "As someone who remembers the Cold War" — does Allan ever describe the specific nuclear deterrence thinking he was exposed to as a Soviet analyst at ONA in the 1980s? Are there other episodes where he draws on that professional Cold War experience more precisely?
  3. The triad of "21st century strategic catastrophes" — Iraq, Brexit, Ukraine — is this the first time Allan uses this grouping? Does he return to it?
  4. He follows Hugh White's work closely and values the Quarterly Essay format for forcing engagement with clear arguments. Does he assess White's response to his critics when the QE is published?
  5. Australia's visa bureaucracy was criticised in the Thailand Track 1.5 — does Allan raise this as a structural foreign policy problem elsewhere in the corpus?