Source — AITW Ep074 — Linda Jakobson (Part 2): Australia-China Relations; Taiwan¶
Episode Metadata¶
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Episode number | 74 |
| Title | Linda Jakobson (Part 2): Australia-China relations; Taiwan |
| Publication date | 2021-05-29 |
| Recording date | Wednesday, 19 May 2021 (same session as Ep073) |
| Guests | Linda Jakobson |
| Allan present | Yes — in interviewer role with one substantive intervention |
| Format | Guest interview (Part 2 of 2); no reading segment |
Summary¶
Part 2 of the Jakobson interview. Topics: Taiwan (Jakobson argues Xi has set himself a timetable on unification; formal declaration of independence would only trigger military force if other states recognised it); why Australia-China relations deteriorated (both sides at fault; COVID inquiry call was unilateral blunder; intelligence establishment driving agenda; inattention from top political leadership); and the path forward. Allan's most pointed contribution: "Tone does matter. And if there are people who are saying that it's an irrelevant addition, they don't understand really how diplomacy works." Followed by the marginalization/irrelevance prediction — "Australia is itself going to become more and more marginalized in the months ahead. We're just going to become irrelevant to the main debate." No reading segment.
Key Quotations¶
"They don't understand really how diplomacy works"¶
"I think tone does matter. And if there are people who are saying that it's an irrelevant addition, they don't understand really how diplomacy works. I don't see any easy way out of where we are now. Now, my worry is that because there is no easy way out, Australia is itself going to become more and more marginalized in the months ahead. We're just going to become irrelevant to the main debate and the main discussions going on."
— Allan Gyngell [00:24:50.640 --> 00:25:39.640]
Allan's only substantive analytical contribution in the episode, and it contains the sharpest professional-authority claim in the corpus to this point. "They don't understand really how diplomacy works" is not hedged — it attributes ignorance to people who dismiss tone as irrelevant, on the basis of professional experience. He does not say they are wrong for political reasons or ideological ones; he says they don't understand how their own tool works. Coming after Linda and Darren have both said tone matters, this lands as corroboration from inside the system. The second element — the marginalization/irrelevance prediction — is equally unhedged. He agrees with Jakobson's framing that Australia risks becoming irrelevant in regional discussions, and adds the time qualifier: "in the months ahead." This is not a long-run structural concern but an imminent one. The third element — "it will take changes in the U.S.-China relationship to see a break" — is the same conclusion Darren reached: Australia cannot change course unilaterally, and the circuit breaker must come from the major-power dynamics.
"Was it us or was it them, or at least how much of it was us and how much of it was them?" (Allan's question)¶
"You've been looking at the situation here since 2011, and it's looking very different, the relationship between China and Australia, from what you saw when you first arrived. How do you interpret it? Do you have a clear idea of what has changed? Was it us or was it them, or at least how much of it was us and how much of it was them?"
— Allan Gyngell [00:06:56.640 --> 00:07:25.640]
A question that reveals his analytical prior. The bilateral-responsibility frame — "us or them, or how much of each" — is the practitioner's starting point: it refuses the single-sided narrative before the answer has arrived. His prior is that in any deteriorated bilateral relationship, both parties have contributed, and the analytical task is calibrating the proportions, not assigning blame. Jakobson's answer confirms this: "I don't think it's ever just one party at fault." The question is a setup for an analytical standard he already holds.
Jakobson on why Australia-China relations deteriorated — both sides¶
"I don't think any single event spurred this downward spiral. Rather, it was a string of incidents and actions by Beijing and a string of responses and policy decisions by Canberra... Both sides are responsible for this situation... I think most of all, I question the unilateral decision by the Foreign Minister to call for an international inquiry into the origins of COVID without consulting or agreeing on joint action with other countries. And then the Prime Minister using the words 'weapons inspector powers'... In Beijing's eyes, could there be a more direct affront on the PRC's sovereignty than to evoke an image of weapons inspectors going into Iraq?"
— Linda Jakobson [00:07:25.640 --> 00:13:40.640]
Jakobson's diagnosis is consistent with Allan's bilateral-responsibility framing. The structural argument is also consistent with his critique from Ep072: the intelligence establishment drove the agenda; top political leadership (Turnbull, then Morrison) was too consumed by domestic politics to develop principled China policy; "realism, statecraft, diplomacy have been sorely lacking in Canberra." The COVID inquiry observation — unilateral call, no consultation, "weapons inspector powers" language — is the forensic analysis of a specific blunder. Allan does not challenge any of this; the silence implies endorsement.
"Stop poking Beijing in the eye at every turn" (Linda Jakobson)¶
"I would say stop poking Beijing in the eye at every turn... there was no reason to cancel the BRI Memorandum of Understanding. First of all, it wasn't an agreement which was binding. It had absolutely no substance content... It was purely a way to slap Beijing in the face... I don't think it's completely genuine to say just tell us what to do and we'll do it."
— Linda Jakobson [00:25:39.640 --> 00:30:07.640]
Jakobson names the BRI cancellation (which Allan himself called out in Ep072 as having no compelling logic) as her primary concrete example of an avoidable provocation. The "stop poking Beijing in the eye" formulation is the practical application of the Finlandisation lesson — small countries cannot afford gratuitous provocation of a great-power neighbour. She also challenges the "tell us what to do" defence: "No, they're not [willing to listen]. Because there was no reason to cancel the BRI MOU." The implicit alignment with Allan's Ep072 analysis is close — he said the legislation treated the national interest as an "eternal flame" and that "Really?" was the appropriate response to the stated rationale.
Biographical Fragments¶
No new biographical fragments emerge from Ep074. Allan's contribution is analytically focused and brief.
Style and Method Evidence¶
- "They don't understand really how diplomacy works": The only instance in the corpus of Allan directly attributing ignorance to unnamed critics on a professional matter. He does not usually make this move — he typically states the correct analysis rather than characterising those who hold the wrong one. The episode's framing (a professional diplomat and two academics all agreeing on the point) apparently licenses the more direct assertion.
- Bilateral responsibility framing as standard question: The "was it us or was it them" formulation is the analyst's prior made explicit — before any answer, the question itself refuses the single-blame narrative.
- Brevity: Allan speaks for approximately 90 seconds across the entire Part 2 episode. His intervention contains three distinct analytical moves (tone; marginalization; US-China circuit breaker), each one sentence. This is the maximum density version of his contribution format.
- Agreement with Linda: He "agrees with almost everything" Darren said, and adds two points rather than offering an alternative view. He is validating a framework he shares.
Open Questions¶
- Marginalization prediction: Allan says Australia will become "more and more marginalized in the months ahead." Does this prediction appear to be confirmed or disconfirmed in subsequent episodes?
- Jakobson's Australia-Indonesia China working group: Does this proposal (formal Australia-Indonesia dialogue on China) appear again in the corpus, from Allan or others?
- "Weapons inspector powers": Allan does not comment on this specific blunder when Jakobson names it. Does he ever address the COVID inquiry decision and its diplomatic consequences himself?
- "Stop poking Beijing in the eye": Jakobson's phrase coincides closely with Allan's own analysis in Ep072. Does this alignment persist as a shared framework in later China policy discussions?