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Source — AITW Ep092 — Our Own Foreign Policy Election Debate

Episode Metadata

Field Value
Episode number 92
Title Ep. 92: Our own foreign policy election "debate"
Publication date 2022-02-21 (with Darren preamble recorded 20 February)
Recording date Thursday, 10 February 2022
Guests None (Allan and Darren only)
Allan present Yes
Format Structured debate: four propositions argued for and against, with sides deliberately swapped. Genuine views explicitly disclaimed during the debate itself. Synthesis section at end reflects genuine views. Reading segment at close.

Summary

An unusual format in which Allan and Darren argue both for and against four foreign policy propositions, having swapped sides across questions. The explicit disclaimer — "you will not necessarily be hearing our views" — complicates biographical reading of the debate proper. However, two things in this episode are unambiguously Allan's actual views: the empirical case he builds for DFAT over defence (which is extensively documented as his genuine position throughout the corpus), and the synthesis at the close, where he sets out the four fundamental questions he believes determine where any serious analyst comes out on Australian foreign policy.

That synthesis is the most analytically organised statement of his worldview in the corpus. He reduces the entire debate to judgments about four things: the United States (will it restore unified purpose?); China (remaker or stakeholder?); the world (messy/contingent or navigable with a clear path?); and Australia's agency (how much do we have?). He does not answer these questions; he identifies them as the axis around which everything else turns.

The DFAT data he deploys in proposition one is worth recording carefully: drawn from a new ASPI paper by "a very distinguished former colleague," James Wise. Allan cites exact figures — DFAT operating budget shrunk 9% in real terms since 2000; Australia ranks 13th globally for defence spending but 27th for diplomatic network; fewer overseas posts than every G20 country except one; only eight missions across 54 African countries. These are not new concerns in the corpus but they are now supported by named, citable data.

A new institutional affiliation is disclosed at close: Allan is a member of the AP4D (Asia-Pacific Defence, Development and Diplomacy Dialogue) advisory board.


Key Quotations

Note on the debate section: positions argued in propositions one through four should not be taken as Allan's personal views without corroboration from elsewhere in the corpus. The synthesis and the DFAT data are confirmed as genuine.


The four fundamental questions — Allan's genuine framework

"The way you respond to each of them will depend in turn on how you think about just a handful, really, of fundamental questions. And for me, I think those questions are at the US, China, the way the world works and Australia itself."

— [00:35:14.260 --> 00:38:19.860]

The most analytically organised expression of Allan's worldview in the corpus. He names four axis-questions: 1. US — bounce-back to liberal order or structurally diminished? 2. China — remaker of the order or stakeholder seeking greater say? 3. World — messy/contingent or navigable with a clear path through it? 4. Australia — high agency (willing to take risks, work with others) or limited agency (security through larger partners)?

Allan does not answer these questions; he identifies them as the generative prior beliefs that determine everything downstream. This is the analyst's discipline: separate the foundational uncertainty from the derived policy disagreement. If you know where someone stands on these four questions, you can predict their positions on DFAT vs defence, China reset, AUKUS vs multilateralism, and Pacific vs Southeast Asia. The framework is reductive but not simplistic — each question is genuinely open, and Allan's own position on each is held with appropriate tentativeness.


US as variable — carried forward from Ep090

"All that AUKUS, Five Eyes and the Quad have in common is the participation of the United States. And this at a time when the US has moved from being a constant to a variable in the international system. We don't need to walk away from the relationship or the ANZUS Treaty, but we are surely taking a huge risk by placing so much reliance on a single actor. We should take note of our own advice to ourselves on trade with China. Diversification is an essential risk mitigation strategy, even when things look to be going well."

— [00:26:53.940 --> 00:30:08.980]

The Ep090 "constant/variable" formulation deployed as a policy argument, now with an explicit structural implication: diversification. The trade-China analogy is sharp and precise — the same logic that drove Australia to diversify its export markets applies to its security architecture. The argument is framed as anti-AUKUS for the purpose of the debate but the underlying concern — over-dependence on a single, now variable, actor — is genuinely his.


DFAT vs defence — the data

"Australia ranks 13th in the world for defence expenditure, but has only the 27th largest diplomatic network. When the Prime Minister announced the 2020 defence update, the increase in the size of the ADF, which he trumpeted then, was bigger than the entire Australian diplomatic service. We've got a smaller number of overseas posts than all but one other G20 country. Only eight missions in the 54 countries of Africa and none at all in Francophone Africa. Furthermore, well over half our posts have three or fewer DFAT staff."

— [00:07:47.020 --> 00:12:34.980]

Allan has had a source. The figures come from James Wise's ASPI paper — "a very distinguished former colleague of mine" — and Allan has read them carefully enough to cite them precisely in oral delivery. The ADF increase exceeding the entire diplomatic service is the sharpest single comparison; it turns an abstraction (underfunding) into a concrete size relationship. He acknowledges the source, acknowledges that not all diplomatic work produces outcomes, but holds the verdict: the imbalance is demonstrable and damaging. This position is corroborated extensively across the corpus.


"To ensure China's respect, we have to respect ourselves"

"If we know anything about dealing with Chinese leaders, it is that consistency and strength, quiet but determined, will get you further over the long term than easy capitulation. To ensure China's respect, we have to respect ourselves."

— [00:21:05.100 --> 00:23:52.580]

The closing line of his case against the South Korea reset option. Despite the debate disclaimer, this position is consistent with Allan's recorded views across the corpus — he has never argued for conciliation that involves abandoning stated values. "Quiet but determined" is his preferred register for dealing with China, consistent with his general preference for skillful diplomacy over loudness. "To ensure China's respect, we have to respect ourselves" is the most aphoristic formulation he delivers in this episode.


South Pacific as "chattily proprietary"

"The small states of the South Pacific offer so many fewer challenges. We mostly share their history of colonialism. They speak English, they attend the same churches we do. They play rugby. We can talk about them as our family in the, what would you say, chattily proprietary way we have adopted."

— [00:30:23.540 --> 00:32:17.900]

Allan arguing for shifting resources from the South Pacific to Southeast Asia, a position he holds as genuinely his in this episode. "Chattily proprietary" is a careful coinage: it names a tone in Australian official discourse about the Pacific — warm, familial, possessive — and implicitly criticises it as patronising. He is arguing that the ease of the Pacific relationship is precisely the reason not to over-invest in it relative to the more demanding engagement Southeast Asia requires.


"Australia would have to pretend to be something that it's not"

"Any government which tried to ignore or downplay those issues would face serious domestic criticism and criticism from other important players. And that wouldn't be a stable basis on which to build a relationship. It would be perpetually at risk of being knocked off course because Australia would have to pretend to be something that it's not."

— [00:21:05.100 --> 00:23:52.580]

The structural argument against the human rights silence option: it would require Australia to sustain a policy position that contradicts what Australia actually is as a political community. Allan's argument is not about moral duty but about political sustainability — a reset built on suppressing domestic values will be fragile. The phrase "pretend to be something that it's not" frames the problem as one of authenticity rather than virtue.


AP4D board membership disclosed

"Full disclosure, I'm a member of the AP4D advisory board, but I had nothing to do with the writing of the papers."

— [00:40:03.860 --> 00:41:01.860]

New institutional affiliation: Allan sits on the advisory board of the Asia-Pacific Defence, Development and Diplomacy Dialogue — an initiative designed to integrate defence, development, and diplomacy thinking in Australian policy. Consistent with his persistent argument for de-siloing these disciplines. His disclosure is immediate and unprompted — consistent with his general intellectual honesty about affiliations (cf. China Matters board disclosure, Ep073).


Biographical Fragments

Evidence type: New

  1. AP4D advisory board membership — Allan is on the advisory board of the Asia-Pacific Defence, Development and Diplomacy Dialogue. Consistent with his advocacy for integrated policy thinking. (Ep092)

  2. James Wise as "a very distinguished former colleague of mine" — Wise was Australian Ambassador in Thailand and is identified as a DFAT colleague. Allan reads and cites his ASPI paper by name. (Ep092)

Evidence type: Reinforcing

  1. DFAT underinvestment as personal cause — The data he deploys (13th in defence, 27th in diplomacy; ADF increase bigger than entire diplomatic service; 8 missions in 54 African countries) is the most empirically precise articulation of a concern that runs through almost every episode. (Ep092)

  2. "To my astonishment, offered a job" — The DFAT argument implicitly draws on his career inside the department; he knows the institution from the inside across five decades. (Ep092)


Style and Method Evidence

  • Analytical before normative: the four-questions framework is the clearest example in the corpus of Allan separating foundational empirical/interpretive questions from policy derivations. He does not say what the answers are; he identifies what the questions are.
  • Debate format self-awareness: he and Darren explicitly swap sides across questions and disclaim their own views. Allan uses the format to argue positions he has held in earnest elsewhere, but the framing is important — he respects the intellectual discipline of steel-manning the opposing view.
  • Data citation: names the source (James Wise, ASPI), cites exact figures in oral delivery, acknowledges the source's limitations (not all diplomatic work productive), and still holds the verdict. The evidential discipline is characteristic.
  • "Chattily proprietary": coinage as critique — a two-word description of an entire tone in Australian Pacific policy discourse.
  • Diversification analogy: trade diversification logic applied to security architecture. Cross-domain reasoning — taking a lesson from geoeconomics and applying it to alliance strategy.
  • AP4D disclosure: immediate, unprompted, precise. He discloses affiliations as a matter of course.

Reading, Listening and Watching

Allan — James Wise, "The Costs of Discounted Diplomacy" (ASPI Strategic Insights, 11 February 2022)

"A very distinguished former colleague of mine, James Wise, who was the Australian ambassador in Thailand, is bringing out a new paper for ASPI called The Costs of Discounted Diplomacy. And in the paper, James shows that since the beginning of the century, the operating budget for DFAT's policy function... has shrunk in real terms by 9%."

— [00:07:47.020 --> 00:12:34.980]

Allan uses this paper as the empirical foundation for his DFAT argument. Wise is identified as a distinguished former colleague — the professional network continues to generate the reading material that informs Allan's analysis. He reads ASPI papers by former DFAT colleagues and deploys their data in public advocacy for the department's resources. The disclosure of authorship and the precision of the citation are both characteristic.

Allan — AP4D Southeast Asia papers

"The release of a series of interesting practical questions on how Australia should be engaging with Southeast Asia... out of the innovative Asia-Pacific Defence, Development and Diplomacy Dialogue. AP4D was established by some far-sighted thinkers in each of those three areas to try to integrate the insights which each of the disciplines can bring to Australian policy and to help de-silo the whole policy process."

— [00:40:03.860 --> 00:41:01.860]

Allan recommends the output of a body he sits on, with immediate disclosure. His enthusiasm for the AP4D project is genuine — it embodies exactly the integration of defence, diplomacy, and development thinking he has argued for throughout the corpus.


Open Questions

  1. The four-questions framework — does Allan return to this organising structure in later episodes, particularly post-election (Ep097+) when the Albanese government begins implementing its own answers to these questions?
  2. AP4D advisory board — does this affiliation appear again in the corpus? Does it generate further recommendations or disclosures?
  3. James Wise as "a very distinguished former colleague" — is Wise's DFAT career overlap with Allan's dateable? The ambassador-to-Thailand role may help place the connection.
  4. "Chattily proprietary" — does Allan use this or similar language about the Pacific again in later episodes, particularly as the Solomon Islands-China security pact (Ep095) forces a reassessment of Australia's Pacific assumptions?
  5. The reset debate — Darren argues for the South Korea option; Allan argues against. Does the Albanese government's subsequent China reset (beginning Ep097+) vindicate either position, and does Allan address this?