Source — AITW Ep061 — Short- and Long-Term Questions for Australian Foreign Policy¶

Episode Metadata¶

Field	Value
Episode number	61
Title	Short- and long-term questions for Australian foreign policy
Publication date	2020-11-16
Recording date	Sunday, 15 November 2020
Guests	None — Allan and Darren only
Allan present	Yes
Format	Thematic discussion — short-term and long-term foreign policy

Summary¶

Structured discussion of Australian foreign policy across two time horizons. Short-term: Australia-China relations — Allan calls for a PM or FM speech setting out Australia's China position ("we've not had such a speech for a long time now"); cites Singapore PM Lee Hsien Loong's 2019 Shangri-La speech as the model; praises Simon Birmingham's skill in the trade portfolio; the CCP vs Chinese government framing debate; RCEP signing; Morrison-Suga trip (Reciprocal Access Agreement — first Japan has signed with any country outside the US, negotiations started under Abbott in 2014). Long-term: climate certainty; Allan discloses "I feel gloomier as I look further outwards. And that's a new feeling for me"; war as "the obvious challenge" and "we think about war too lightly"; specialisation thesis (Darren); investment in human capital, defence, social cohesion, and above all diplomacy. Major meta-moment: Allan catches Darren giving Australia more agency than in earlier conversations — "it seems to me that I'm making some progress with you." Reading: Evan Osnos on Joe Biden (Ezra Klein show) and Tewes/Torrigan on Xi Jinping (Little Red Podcast).

Key Quotations¶

"I feel gloomier as I look further outwards. And that's a new feeling for me."¶

"I feel gloomier as I look further outwards. And that's a new feeling for me."

— [00:30:24.620 --> 00:31:59.940]

A compressed but significant personal disclosure — "that's a new feeling for me" is the significant phrase. Earlier in the corpus, Allan's stated orientation is "optimistic, but with increasing anxiety" (Ep012). By November 2020 — post-COVID, post-Trump, post-Australia-China deterioration — the long-range outlook has darkened enough that he names the change explicitly. He does not dwell on it; one sentence and he moves on. Characteristically, he does not catastrophise either. But "a new feeling for me" is genuine: a man who has spent fifty years working on Australian foreign policy and was constitutionally oriented toward qualified optimism now finds the far horizon genuinely gloomy.

"We think about war too lightly"¶

"War is the obvious challenge. It seems to me, or I worry anyway, that we think about war too lightly. For most people now, war is something that happens in remote places in the Middle East. We line up and pay tribute to our soldiers, but we never think of it as something that will directly affect us in the way that the terrible memories of the First and Second World Wars weighed on the emotions and the policies of politicians and citizens during the 20th century, or even the concern about nuclear conflict, which drove the peace movement during the Cold War."

— [00:38:08.260 --> 00:38:49.700]

The most direct warning about the risk of war in the corpus to this point. Allan names it as the "obvious" biggest risk — and the reason it is the biggest risk is precisely that it is not being treated as obvious. The memorial culture ("we line up and pay tribute") without genuine strategic imagination of what war means is the problem. He reaches back across the full span of his adult life: the Cold War peace movement driven by nuclear anxiety; the living weight of WWI and WWII on the generation that preceded him. Those anchors are gone. "We think about war too lightly" is the sentence a person says when they have spent their career in national security assessment and believe the political system has lost its fear.

"I'm making some progress with you, Darren"¶

"Let me interrupt you there, Darren. It seems to me that I'm making some progress with you, and in the way you've framed that answer, you're allowing Australia more agency in the world than you would have done in earlier conversations. The language you're using is just slightly more nuanced and optimistic and full of potential than you would have wanted."

— [00:35:16.580 --> 00:35:46.500]

A rare metacognitive observation — Allan stepping outside the conversation to comment on Darren's intellectual development across the podcast. He is monitoring it. The warmth is unmistakable; so is the precision. He is not claiming victory in the agency debate but registering an observable shift in language and framing. Darren's response is characteristically self-aware: "Is that right? Maybe." The exchange captures something essential about their relationship: Allan as the experienced practitioner gently adjusting the frame, Darren as the theorist who eventually notices his own resistance weakening.

"I wouldn't start from here"¶

"Unfortunately, as in that old joke about the response to a traveler who asks directions in Ireland and is told, I wouldn't start from here. We've often talked before about the missteps, as I see them, that Australia has taken... But unfortunately, here's where we are."

— [00:03:39.060 --> 00:06:21.060]

The Irish directions joke deployed to frame Australia's China predicament. Not quite a "characteristic phrase" in the sense of an Allan coinage — it is a well-known joke — but his reaching for it is characteristic. He names the missteps honestly, does not pretend we can go back, and immediately pivots to: "here's where we are." The realism is not defeatism; it clears the ground for practical analysis.

"A continent for ourselves and a border with no one" (Keating)¶

"We'll still have the huge strategic advantages we have now of a continent for ourselves and a border with no one, as Paul Keating used to say."

— [00:30:24.620 --> 00:31:59.940]

Allan attributes this formulation to Paul Keating — "used to say" implies a phrase he heard often in the PM's office. It is one of the most resonant geographical descriptions of Australia's strategic position: the single-country continent, no land border, no territorial neighbour to create friction. Allan invokes it here as a fixed asset that will persist regardless of the gloomier trajectory he has just described. The Keating attribution and the casual recall suggest this is a phrase that has stayed with him for thirty years.

"We've not had such a speech for a long time now"¶

"A good first step would be for the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister simply to make a serious speech setting out for the Australian public what our position is on China. We've not had such a speech for a long time now, and policy therefore has had to be intuited through coded language in media doorstops, off-the-record briefings to journalists, which then appear in the paper, but you're never quite sure what authority they have, and the use of surrogate messengers."

— [00:03:39.060 --> 00:06:21.060]

Allan's most prescriptive China policy statement to this point. He frames the problem precisely: the absence of a clear, comprehensive, public position has left a vacuum filled by leaks, doorstops, and surrogates. His model for what such a speech could look like is Singapore PM Lee Hsien Loong's Shangri-La 2019 speech — a specific, recoverable, externally verifiable reference. He calls it "possible for regional leaders to do this thoughtfully and effectively," diplomatically not calling the Australian failure an inability.

Biographical Fragments¶

Evidence type: Corroborating — Keating formulation retained from PM's office

"A continent for ourselves and a border with no one, as Paul Keating used to say": Allan attributes this geographic description of Australia's strategic position to Keating, with "used to say" implying personal, repeated exposure — almost certainly heard during his years in the PM's office (Ep061). The phrase is shorthand for Australia's fundamental geopolitical advantage and Keating deployed it in the foreign policy context. Allan's casual recall suggests it has been part of his analytical repertoire for thirty years.

Evidence type: New — Explicit acknowledgement of shifting long-range outlook

"I feel gloomier as I look further outwards. And that's a new feeling for me." (Ep061, November 2020): A direct self-disclosure that his long-range strategic outlook has darkened. Earlier in the corpus he describes himself as "optimistic, but with increasing anxiety" (Ep012, early 2019). By November 2020 — after COVID, Trump, and the Australia-China deterioration — the far horizon has become genuinely gloomy. He names the shift explicitly and does not linger on it. A practitioner's honest accounting of what five decades of optimistic engagement now feels like at age 72.

Style and Method Evidence¶

"It seems to me that I'm making some progress with you": The single most explicit metacognitive observation in the corpus — Allan watching and commenting on Darren's intellectual development across the podcast. He monitors it with evident pleasure and characteristic precision.
Singapore PM Lee as the positive model: Rather than just criticising Morrison's absence of a China speech, Allan points to a specific, publicly available example of what a good one looks like: Lee Hsien Loong's Shangri-La 2019 speech. His critique is constructive and comes with a deliverable.
Simon Birmingham named as "most effective minister in dealing with China": Direct superlative verdict, offered without hedging. Confirms his habit of naming individual excellence in ministerial performance (cf. his assessments of Gareth Evans, Marise Payne).
The Keating quotation recalled: Not cited with scholarly precision but with "used to say" — a phrase heard repeatedly in the PM's office. This is biographical memory operating as analytical resource.
The Australian specialisation question: Darren raises specialisation (ISR, special forces) as Australia's strategic niche; Allan receives it seriously but does not develop a counter-niche list — his answer is about investment categories (human capital, defence, social cohesion, diplomacy), not specific capabilities. Consistent with his generalist foreign policy stance.
"Joe Biden wrote recently that under his administration, diplomacy would be the first instrument of American power. I'd love to see any Australian political leader make the same sort of statement.": The diplomatic investment argument deployed by contrast with Biden — and with evident longing.

Reading / Listening Segment¶

Allan recommends two on the leaders who will most influence Australia:

Evan Osnos — "Joe Biden Explained" (Ezra Klein Show): Osnos (New Yorker journalist, author of Age of Ambition) interviewed about his new Biden biography. "Really thoughtful and useful from an Australian practical point of view, introductions to the two men."
Frederick Tewes and Joseph Torrigan — "Shi Dada and Daddy Power, the Party and the President" (Little Red Podcast): Academic interview on Xi Jinping. Framed as the companion piece to the Biden episode — both leaders who will most shape Australia's near-term environment.

Darren: PE With Joe (YouTube, family exercise videos from UK lockdown). Allan: "He is very perky."

Open Questions¶

Lee Hsien Loong's Shangri-La Dialogue 2019 speech: Allan names it specifically as a model for Australia's China speech. Does it appear again in the corpus? Was it publicly available and did AIIA circulate it?
Abbott-era RAA negotiations (2014): Allan says Australia-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement negotiations started under Abbott in 2014 — a six-year negotiation timeline. Is this independently verifiable? Was Allan involved in the ONA/AIIA advisory context around those negotiations?
"A continent for ourselves and a border with no one": Is this a documented Keating phrase? Allan recalls it as something Keating "used to say" — not a formal speech but a recurring private formulation. Worth checking Keating speech archives.
Allan's long-range gloom (November 2020): Does this shift persist across later episodes, or does it fluctuate? A comparison with his stated orientation in later episodes would show whether November 2020 was a trough or a new baseline.