Source — AITW Ep014 — North Korea After Hanoi; India-Pakistan Deescalates; Indonesian FTA¶
Episode Metadata¶
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Episode number | 14 |
| Title | North Korea after Hanoi; India-Pakistan crisis deescalates; Indonesian FTA |
| Publication date | 2019-03-15 |
| Guests | None (Darren and Allan only) |
| Allan present | Yes |
| Format | Standard two-host format |
Summary¶
A three-topic episode covering: (1) nuclear weapons theory and the Hanoi summit failure; (2) de-escalation of the India-Pakistan Kashmir crisis; (3) the Australia-Indonesia free trade agreement (IA-CEPA).
The episode contains one of Allan's most important biographical fragments: his direct placement in Keating's office in June 1994, travelling with the Prime Minister to Indonesia with 200 Australian companies. It also contains his explicit self-description as a "nuclear abolitionist" — despite opposing the Nuclear Ban Treaty — and a crisp statement on the nature of diplomacy: "diplomacy often has to be conducted with truly awful people."
Key Quotations¶
Allan as nuclear abolitionist (against the Ban Treaty)¶
"I'm an abolitionist, although I think that the process is long and difficult. And for that reason, I don't support the Nuclear Ban Treaty, which is a sort of normative declaration that they should be illegal. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't be doing all we can to limit the catastrophic dangers. So I'm afraid I just can't see nuclear weapons as a stabilising force."
— [00:03:35.460 --> 00:05:12.460]
A carefully calibrated position: abolitionism as a long-term aspiration, but skepticism about declaratory norm-setting without enforcement. The rejection of the Ban Treaty is not a rejection of the goal — it is a judgment about what is effective.
1983 nuclear close call (via Gordievsky)¶
"As the Duke of Wellington probably didn't say about the Battle of Waterloo, it was a damn close run thing. You remember last week I was talking about Ben McIntyre's book, The Spy and the Traitor, which is about the British KGB spy Oleg Gordievsky. And that was a reminder of how close we came in 1983 in the NATO Able Archer exercise to real nuclear conflict."
— [00:03:35.460 --> 00:05:12.460]
Reading is analytical resource. The Gordievsky book, recommended last episode as "thrillingly written," is here used as evidence in a policy argument. The Wellington attribution also displays historical range — the phrase "probably didn't say" is characteristic epistemic precision.
Trump as New York property developer¶
"Trump's decision to walk away really underlined one of the broader problems with his presidency, which is a tendency to see the complex world through the lens of a New York property developer. So he was sort of following practice that he was used to, but unlike a commercial negotiation in New York, the person on the other side of the table wasn't likely to come back and raise the price or not and do the deal."
— [00:10:55.460 --> 00:11:42.840]
Structural argument: not a criticism of Trump's character but a mismatch between his cognitive model and diplomatic reality.
On process versus outcome in diplomacy¶
"I was perfectly prepared to accept that nothing we've done before has worked and that reaching out at the leadership level, making surprising offers was worth having a go... by the most solid and intensive staff work, which meant that when the leaders finally got together, a deal was clean, not necessarily done, but clearly visible from both sides. And that doesn't seem to have been the case in Singapore and doesn't seem to have been the case here."
— [00:12:10.960 --> 00:13:44.460]
Allan endorses the impulse to try something new but insists on professional preparation as the precondition for productive summitry. The test of a summit is not its outcome but whether both sides arrived with a clear view of what a deal would look like.
Diplomacy with "truly awful people"¶
"I don't have any problem with the president dealing with Kim. I mean, diplomacy often has to be conducted with truly awful people. I mean, that's the point of diplomacy in some cases. I do have a problem with the particular Trumpist form of showering praise on him."
— [00:16:07.460 --> 00:17:05.460]
Classic Gyngell move: separate what is intrinsically necessary (dealing with awful people) from what is foolish or counterproductive (the celebrity dimension). The phrase "that's the point of diplomacy in some cases" is flat, declarative, experienced.
Iran nuclear deal: learning the wrong lesson¶
"Going back to the Iran nuclear deal, it's again a reason why I think the US efforts to undo it are so misjudged, because one of the things the Iranians must be learning from this is that the current US president can fall in love with you if you've got nuclear weapons, but not if you don't."
— [00:22:37.460 --> 00:23:11.460]
Structural analysis cutting across two cases: what North Korea demonstrates about the value of nuclear weapons will be observed by Iran. Cross-domain inference, compact.
Biographical fragment: Keating's office, June 1994, Indonesia¶
"There's certainly been periods of more and less Australian focus on Indonesia, Keating in the early 1990s and Howard after the Indian Ocean tsunami were recent high points... In June 1994, as it happens, when I was working in Keating's office, I went with him to Indonesia with 200 Australian companies were participating in a trade fair. And that was when Keating sort of formulated the line that no country was more important to Australia than Indonesia."
— [00:39:32.460 --> 00:42:09.460]
The most specific career placement yet in Ep001–Ep014. Confirms: Allan was working in the Prime Minister's office (specifically Keating's) in June 1994, in a capacity that had him travelling with the PM on significant diplomatic-commercial visits. This is different from a career in DFAT — it suggests a senior advisory role within the executive government.
Indonesia: "bloody hard work"¶
"I don't think anyone has really doubted the potential. It's just that it's, you know, bloody hard work for Australian companies and they mostly prefer easier pastures."
— [00:39:32.460 --> 00:42:09.460]
Colloquial, grounded. The phrase "bloody hard work" is characteristically unsentimental — he has lived the Indonesia relationship and has no illusions about it.
Preferential trade as "second best"¶
"I've hung around economists at the ANU long enough to believe that preferential trade agreements like this are decidedly second best option, paired with multilateral deals. But this is nevertheless a useful step forward."
— [00:39:32.460 --> 00:42:09.460]
Self-aware about the source of his economic views: ANU economists. Transparency about where his views come from. The position — bilateral PTAs are second best but still useful — is nuanced and resists both boosterism and dismissal.
Biographical Fragments¶
Evidence type: Confirmed (directly stated) - June 1994: Allan was working in Keating's office (the Prime Minister's office), involved in accompanying Keating to Indonesia as part of a major trade mission with 200 Australian companies. - This is his most specific career placement post-1969: the 1994 Keating office role.
Evidence type: Inferred / Likely - "Keating in the early 1990s": suggests Allan had a connection to or followed Keating-era Indonesian policy closely, consistent with working for him. - "I've hung around economists at the ANU long enough": suggests time at the ANU at some point, possibly before or after the Keating office role. (ANU proximity is consistent with Canberra base throughout career.)
Style and Method Evidence¶
- Abolitionism with procedural scepticism: the position on nuclear weapons models Allan's general approach to norms — he believes in the goal, but distrust declaratory instruments without enforcement mechanisms. Compare R2P in Ep001, where he supported the norm but noted Libya "over-stretched" it.
- Reading as analytic resource: the Gordievsky book, mentioned in Ep013, returns here as evidence. Allan reads for use.
- Cross-domain inference: the Iran-Korea nuclear lesson — unusual in that it links two very different cases. This is a sign of systematic thinking, not just regional expertise.
- "That's the point of diplomacy in some cases": the flatness of this is deliberate. No elaboration needed. Five decades of practice speaking.
Reading, Listening and Watching¶
Carnegie Endowment — Diplo Pod — Evan Feigenbaum episode, "Where is the U.S.-China relationship going?"
"It sometimes feels in Canberra at the moment that it's all China all the time... in the continuing search for sensible, informed commentary, I recommend a recent podcast from the Carnegie Endowment's excellent series, Diplo Pod. Evan Feigenbaum, who's just become vice president of studies at Carnegie, did one called 'Where is the U.S.-China relationship going?' Feigenbaum has long experience in China and Asia, particularly in the State Department. And I thought that given how directly Australian interests are affected by U.S. policy towards China, this was a really useful, informed account of how things have got to this point and where they are heading. And that's sobering for Australian listeners to think about."
— [00:43:04.460 --> 00:44:08.900]
He listens to podcasts not as entertainment but as policy intelligence. "Sensible, informed commentary" is his explicit criterion. He values State Department experience — "deep knowledge" from practitioners.
Open Questions¶
- What was Allan's precise title/role in Keating's office in 1994? "Working in Keating's office" is a direct statement but the formal title is unclear.
- How long did he work in that role? Was it a brief secondment or a sustained position?
- The ANU reference: when did he first engage with ANU economists — was this during the Hawke/Keating era, before, or after?
- He says Keating "formulated the line that no country was more important to Australia than Indonesia" during this trip — this implies Allan was a witness to the making of a phrase that became famous in Australian foreign policy.