Source — AITW Ep041 — Richard Maude on the Indo-Pacific, Models of World Politics, and Australian Foreign Policy¶

Episode Metadata¶

Field	Value
Episode number	41
Title	Ep. 41: Richard Maude on the Indo-Pacific, models of world politics, and Australian foreign policy
Publication date	2020-02-28
Recording date	Late February 2020 (not explicitly stated)
Guests	Richard Maude (former ONA DG — Allan's direct successor; PM Gillard's Senior Foreign Policy and National Security Advisor; led 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper task force; former head of DFAT's Indo-Pacific Group; Asia Society Policy Institute)
Allan present	Yes
Format	Guest interview — Allan introduces Maude, questions with Darren

Summary¶

Allan introduces Richard Maude — his direct successor as Director-General of ONA — in what he calls "the best job in the gift of the Australian government." The introduction contains the most significant career-dating evidence since Ep035: Maude was Allan's successor, placing Allan's ONA DG departure at approximately 2013/14. The conversation covers: the Indo-Pacific as a "mental map" and Australia's strategy within it; how the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper's analysis has held up (trends correct, but world more challenging); sovereignty and its risks for collective action; whether the rules-based order survives; China's domestic political arrangements as a foreign policy factor; the chronic failure to convince governments to invest in diplomacy ("there's no diplomacy industrial complex in our business"); and how think tanks and academics break through to government. Allan confesses to having been publicly sceptical of the White Paper at the time while now acknowledging its beneficial influence on Australian policy. No reading segment.

Key Quotations¶

"Richard was my successor as Director-General of ONA, the best job in the gift of the Australian government"¶

"Richard was my successor as Director-General of ONA, the best job in the gift of the Australian government, I think we'd both agree."

— [00:00:27.650 --> 00:02:49.650]

The most significant biographical disclosure in this episode and one of the most important career-dating fragments in the corpus. Two things confirmed simultaneously: (1) Richard Maude was Allan's direct successor as ONA DG — meaning Allan's tenure ended immediately before Maude's began (approximately 2013/14); (2) Allan's characterisation of the ONA DG role as the apex of the Australian public service — not Prime Minister's office, not DFAT Secretary, but the Director-General of national intelligence assessment. "The best job in the gift of the Australian government" is superlative and unqualified. It is also an indirect disclosure of how much he valued and is proud of the role.

"I confess I was publicly, I think, a sceptic at the time"¶

"I confess that I was publicly, I think, a sceptic at the time about the purpose. It had always seemed to me that foreign Policy was too messy and variable a process to be pinned [down in] a practical document... the failure of the government to allocate the resources necessary to address the unprecedented challenges which it described was a big disappointment to me. But the White Paper's analysis has certainly shaped Australia's foreign Policy in beneficial [ways]."

— [00:07:41.650 --> 00:08:50.650]

A characteristic re-evaluation on record. Allan does not simply say the White Paper proved valuable — he is explicit that he was a public sceptic at the time and updates his view. The hedging phrase "I think" in "I was publicly, I think, a sceptic" is his standard epistemic qualifier; he is not quite certain of his own past position. He maintains one criticism: the government failed to allocate resources commensurate with the challenges the paper identified. His endorsement of the analysis is genuine; his disappointment at the resourcing gap is persistent and consistent with his broader argument about underinvestment in the instruments of foreign policy.

"There's no diplomacy industrial complex either in our business"¶

"Yeah, there's no diplomacy industrial complex either in our business."

— [00:40:16.650 --> 00:40:22.650]

Context: Maude has listed reasons why diplomacy is chronically underfunded — no burning platform; fiscal pressure; politics of giving money to diplomats over security agencies. Allan's one-line addition — borrowing Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex" — names the structural reason: no organised constituency of contractors, suppliers, and lobbyists with a direct financial interest in a larger diplomatic budget. The defence budget has one; the intelligence budget has one; the diplomacy budget does not. Characteristic compression: six words that add an entirely new dimension to what Maude has just said.

"In the National interest was the title of the first Foreign Policy White Paper that the Howard government did"¶

"In the National interest was the title of the first Foreign Policy White Paper that the House [Howard] government did."

— [00:15:37.650 --> 00:15:43.650 (approx)]

Context: Maude observes that an emphasis on sovereignty isn't unusual for Coalition governments. Allan's interjection is instant, precise, and from memory. He recalls not just that a White Paper existed but its exact title — In the National Interest (1997) — and uses it to corroborate Maude's point. This is the kind of institutional memory recall that characterises him throughout the corpus: no notes, no pause, immediate precision.

"Why have Australian diplomats and those of us who believe that foreign Policy is a critical element of Australian statecraft failed so comprehensively to convince Australian governments to invest in it?"¶

"Richard, why have Australian diplomats and those of us who believe that foreign Policy is a critical element of Australian statecraft failed so comprehensively to convince Australian governments and the Australian public to invest in it? Is it the issue itself or the way we go about it?"

— [00:37:14.990 --> 00:37:32.990]

One of Allan's sharpest diagnostic questions in the series. The framing is significant: "failed so comprehensively" — not "struggled" or "found it difficult." He is asking Maude to own a collective failure, and the "those of us" includes himself. The question also reveals a characteristic habit: he frames failure honestly before asking for explanations. He does not suggest the problem is resolvable; he asks why it is so persistent.

"I have very mixed feelings about having Richard on here"¶

"Now, I have very mixed feelings about having Richard on here. The part of me that thinks that the international challenges Australia faces have not been greater for 70 years and that we need the most able public servants we can get on the [front line] on the other hand, as President of the AIIA, an organisation that wants Australians to know more, understand more and engage more with international affairs, I welcome the presence of such a thoughtful practitioner's voice in the National security debate."

— [00:00:27.650 --> 00:02:49.650]

A rare direct expression of ambivalence — and a structural tension Allan himself has navigated. He left government to go to the Lowy Institute and then returned; he values both the practitioner and the public-intellectual role. The joke is genuine: the best people should be in government during the hardest challenges; their absence is a cost. But the public debate also needs practitioners who can speak plainly. He holds both truths. "Challenges have not been greater for 70 years" is a consistent formulation across the corpus.

Biographical Fragments¶

Evidence type: MAJOR CONFIRMED — career end date

"Richard was my successor as Director-General of ONA" — confirms that Richard Maude directly succeeded Allan as ONA DG. Maude is known to have become ONA DG approximately 2013/14. This pins Allan's ONA DG departure to approximately 2013/14. Combined with the Rudd-era entry (~2007/8, confirmed Ep035) and the Holbrooke period active years (2009–2010, confirmed Ep037) and the Symon overlap (2011–2014, confirmed Ep024), the ONA DG career arc is now substantially complete: approximately 2007/8 to 2013/14. (Ep041)
"The best job in the gift of the Australian government" — explicit self-disclosure of how Allan regarded the ONA DG role. Not PM's office (where he worked under Keating); not AIIA; but the ONA DG. The intelligence assessment role, with its direct reporting line to the Prime Minister and its structural independence from departmental interests, was the pinnacle of his professional life in his own assessment. (Ep041)

Notes on Guest: Richard Maude¶

Richard Maude is one of the most important figures in the AITW corpus: he is Allan's direct successor at ONA, and the person who drafted the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper that Allan has used as a benchmark throughout the series. Their relationship is warm and evidently deep — Allan's introduction reveals genuine admiration ("few people in government more interested in ideas about the world than you were, I think") alongside a real institutional bond (shared ONA tenure).

Maude's view on the China debate is important: China's domestic political arrangements are a significant factor (more so than Allan typically allows) — he cites the ideological shift toward a system "hostile to the West," the Communist Party's effort to reshape the international system to legitimise its form of government, and the view that IP theft and cyber attacks would not be as severe "were we dealing with a different kind of China." He also articulates the "two tribes" critique from the AFR (hawks vs pragmatists) more sceptically than either tribe — arguing the real problem is whether integrated advice reaches government, not which tribe is "right."

His observation on "insight" as an intelligence concept — "it's a word that intelligence assessment agencies use quite a lot" — is a practitioner disclosure from inside the culture Allan helped build.

Style and Method Evidence¶

The introductory mixed-feelings disclosure: Allan does not offer warm platitudes about guests joining the podcast. He tells you precisely how he feels, including the tension. The ambivalence is real and analytical.
Instant historical precision: In the National Interest (1997 Howard White Paper) recalled from memory, immediately. The institutional memory database is deep and instantly retrievable.
"Failed so comprehensively": Allan does not soften the framing of collective failures. He could have said "struggled to convince" — he chose "failed so comprehensively." The diagnostic is honest.
"There's no diplomacy industrial complex in our business": A single sentence that adds a structural argument to everything Maude has just said — Eisenhower's concept applied, in six words, to a completely different institutional context. Characteristic compression.

Reading, Listening and Watching¶

No reading/watching/listening segment. The episode closes directly after Allan's closing thank-you to Maude.

Open Questions¶

Richard Maude became ONA DG after Allan, approximately 2013/14. Allan left to become AIIA National President (confirmed Ep001). Is there any episode where Allan describes the transition out of ONA more directly?
Allan's public scepticism about the 2017 White Paper is mentioned here — does he say anything more specific about when or where he expressed this publicly?
The "diplomacy industrial complex" line is a sharp structural observation. Does Allan develop this elsewhere — the absence of a constituency for diplomatic investment?
Maude's observation that China's domestic political arrangements are a more significant factor than often acknowledged — does Allan engage with or respond to this framing in later episodes? It is somewhat more hawkish than Allan's typical "boring pragmatist" position.