Source — AITW Ep080 — Gary Quinlan (Part 1): Indonesia in the World; Diplomacy in a Time of COVID-19¶
Episode Metadata¶
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Episode number | 80 |
| Title | Ep. 80: Gary Quinlan (Part 1): On Indonesia in the world, and diplomacy in a time of COVID-19 |
| Publication date | 2021-08-26 |
| Recording date | Thursday, 5 August 2021 |
| Guests | Gary Quinlan (recently retired Ambassador to Indonesia; former Permanent Representative to the UN) |
| Allan present | Yes — as host and interviewer |
| Format | Long-form guest interview (Part 1 of 2); Allan in interviewer role throughout; minimal Allan analysis. Topics: pandemic diplomacy from Jakarta; future of the profession; Indonesian worldview and domestic politics; Islam in Indonesian foreign policy; Indonesia-China relations; Indonesia and the US. |
Summary¶
Part 1 of a two-part conversation with Gary Quinlan, one of Australia's most decorated recent diplomats. Allan is primarily interviewer here; the substantive content is Quinlan's. Allan's analytical voice is reduced but his question design and introduction are revealing. The main value for the biographical project is: (1) Allan's framing of what constitutes an exceptional foreign service career — the three-pillar test — applied to a peer; (2) the glimpse of Allan's peer network and how he regards them; (3) Quinlan's Indonesia material providing context for Allan's later analytical work on Indonesia. Part 2 (Ep081) covers the Australia-Indonesia bilateral relationship and will likely yield more Allan analysis.
No new biographical fragments about Allan. Quinlan's first posting yielded the Irish Country Women's Association award in 1976 — placing him as slightly junior to Allan (who started ~1969).
Key Quotations¶
Allan's introduction — the three-pillar test¶
"You would have to describe Gary's career in Australian foreign policy as stellar. I don't think we have had anyone like him in the Australian Foreign Service this century, that is someone who has worked at the top of each of the three pillars of Australian foreign policy: the region, the alliance, the rules-based order."
— [00:00:42.950 --> 00:03:31.130]
The three-pillar framework — region, alliance, rules-based order — is Allan's own organising lens for Australian foreign policy, applied here as a career evaluation tool. Working at the top of all three simultaneously is the highest standard. This is what Allan's career spanned too, though from a different angle (ONA/intelligence rather than operational diplomacy).
"Almost as long as me. Not quite."¶
"Darren likes to remind me that I've been around for a long time, so it's nice to be talking to someone who has been around almost as long as me. Not quite, I acknowledge that."
— [00:00:42.950 --> 00:03:31.130]
The parenthetical "Not quite, I acknowledge that" is characteristic: the precision is real, not false modesty. Quinlan's first posting was 1976 (seven years after Allan's 1969 start). Allan locates Quinlan as a peer — close to his cohort but not identical.
"Where did you see that, Gary?"¶
[Gary Quinlan mentions disinformation circulating in Indonesia during COVID] "Where did you see that, Gary? Can I just ask?"
— [00:12:48.410 --> 00:12:51.810]
The intelligence-professional reflex: ground the claim in specific observed evidence. Allan does not let a general assertion pass unchallenged. The interjection is brief and collegial but the habit is consistent throughout the corpus.
On the Irish Country Women's Association award¶
[Gary Quinlan: "On my first posting, I was given the Irish Country Women's Association Man of the Year Award in 1976. I've never quite reached that apex again."] "I missed that on the CV, but I'm glad that you've brought it up for the record."
— [00:03:31.490 --> 00:04:23.330]
Dry institutional wit. The "for the record" is particularly characteristic — treating a joke as something worth formally noting. The lightness of the exchange reveals the comfort of peer-to-peer conversation between two people with long shared institutional experience.
Quinlan on Indonesia — Key Material¶
Indonesia's "free and active" doctrine¶
Indonesia's foreign policy DNA traces to Vice President Mohammed Hatta's Foreign Affairs article of the early 1950s: "free" (independent) and "active" — designed to preserve strategic space during Cold War superpower competition. Today this has evolved into a pursuit of "strategic equilibrium," hedging against risk from the major powers while maximising Indonesian freedom of manoeuvre. Non-interference remains constitutive but is "somewhat more sophisticated" than before. Three operating strands: secular nationalism (sovereignty above all), economic diplomacy (transactional, not ideological), and a commitment to internationalism and rules.
Domestic Islam — holding the centre¶
Indonesia chose the Pancasila secular path at independence rather than constitutional Islam. Widodo has managed the growing influence of political Islam by co-opting rather than confronting: appointing the head of the Ulema Council as vice president; building an 11-party parliamentary coalition; systematically removing perceived Islamists from bureaucracy, universities, and state-owned enterprises. Quinlan judges Indonesia as "holding the centre, and holding it well" — though the systematic removal of educated Islamists from public institutions carries a medium-term risk of radicalisation.
Indonesia-China — Natuna Islands as the limit¶
Indonesia-China bilateral tensions are infrequent but the pattern is clear: any infringement on Indonesian sovereignty triggers a sharp reaction. The early 2020 Natuna Islands fishing incursion (Chinese vessels in Indonesia's EEZ) prompted military deployment and strong foreign minister statements; the message to Beijing was conveyed and heeded. China is restrained with Indonesia in a way it is not with Australia because Indonesia is strategically indispensable to China — as ASEAN anchor, maritime chokepoint, and future market.
Indonesia watching Australia-China¶
Quinlan: Indonesia is watching Australia's handling of China "to see what are the boundaries that China has set in relations with Australia" — using Australia as a calibration point for its own risk assessment. They value Australian resilience as a partner and do not want Australia to cease to be a credible strategic partner.
Vaccine diplomacy — China's early lead eroding¶
China had the first-responder advantage: first with masks, oxygen, and Sinovac vaccines. But as Indonesia became the Delta epicentre, Sinovac's low efficacy was exposed. US, Japan, and Australia vaccination assistance is catching up. Quinlan: "it'll be very interesting to see... what the longer term sense of that is going to be in impacting on China's brand for dependability."
Style and Method Evidence (Allan as interviewer)¶
- Introduction structure: career framed through Allan's three-pillar test; then specific postings and roles in chronological clusters; closes with the most demanding role (PM Rudd's foreign policy advisor) and a light joke about it ("kick your shoes off, put your feet up sort of job").
- Question precision: "How do Indonesians think about the world and Indonesia's place in it?" — the same structural question Allan asked Harinder Sidhu on India (Ep048). Allan has a consistent first question for country experts: the worldview before the policy.
- Immediate grounding: the "Where did you see that?" interjection is short but revealing — the same reflex as in his own analytical contributions.
Open Questions¶
- Part 2 (Ep081) covers Australia-Indonesia bilateral relations — likely to yield significantly more Allan analysis. Process together with this episode.
- Does Allan return to the "strategic equilibrium" framing for Indonesia in later episodes, particularly after AUKUS?
- Quinlan's remark that Indonesia watches Australia's China handling as a calibration point — does Allan pick this up analytically in later episodes?
- The Ahok story (Chinese-Christian politician; jailed then appointed to head Pertamina) — does Allan reference this in his later analysis of Indonesian domestic politics?