Source — AITW Ep072 — Leaving Afghanistan; Aust-NZ-China Relations; Biden-Suga Summit¶

Episode Metadata¶

Field	Value
Episode number	72
Title	Leaving Afghanistan; Aust-NZ-China relations; Biden-Suga summit
Publication date	2021-04-25
Recording date	Friday, 23 April 2021
Guests	None — Allan and Darren only
Allan present	Yes
Format	Regular news episode — three items plus reading segment

Summary¶

Three items: (1) Biden's announcement that all US troops would leave Afghanistan by September 11 — Allan supports the decision, draws two lessons (how quickly national security focus shifts; how hard and expensive nation-building is), and explicitly endorses Biden's earlier position (argued against Gates and Clinton in the Obama administration for a smaller counter-terrorism presence); (2) Contrasting NZ-Australia approaches to China — Allan fully defends Mahuta's Five Eyes comments and China speech, sharply critiques the Victorian BRI MOU cancellation legislation as treating foreign policy "like an eternal flame," and delivers the bluntest verdict in the corpus on Australia's absence of China strategy; (3) Biden-Suga summit — "the focus was on Japan, but the audience was China," with a candid self-correction: "I think I underestimated how consistent his administration's focus on Asia would be." Reading segment: Rana Mitta's 2021 Reischauer lectures, Harvard Fairbank Center — sought out as an antidote to what Allan calls the "bumper sticker nature of much of what passes public discussion about China in Australia."

Episode significance: No new biographical fragments, but rich in characteristic phrases, methodological commitments, and a third consecutive episode self-correction (after Quad scepticism and Rorty/human rights in Ep070). The Mahuta/BRI pair is the sharpest foreign policy critique in the corpus to this point.

Key Quotations¶

"The focus was on Japan, but the audience was China"¶

"The focus was on Japan, but the audience was China. Scott Morrison was the first foreign leader to meet Suga in Tokyo, of course, and Suga is now the first foreign leader to meet Biden in Washington."

— [00:36:39.060 --> 00:38:24.040]

Characteristic compression — an entire geo-strategic analysis in one sentence. The Biden-Suga summit was nominally bilateral, but its content (Taiwan, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, 5G, AI, semiconductors) and its symbolism (Biden's first Washington bilateral) were structured around a third party. The Morrison parallel (first to meet Suga in Tokyo) is incidentally useful: Australia too has been cultivating the Japan alignment, though it gets no credit in the US-Japan summit dynamics. Allan does not dwell on that — he simply notes it. The compression is the point: the sentence does more analytical work than a paragraph.

"An eternal flame, kept in the Foreign Minister's office, always the same, never varying"¶

"I do find it concerning that Australia has put in place legislation which assumes that Australian foreign policy and the national interest are like an eternal flame, you know, kept in the Foreign Minister's office, always the same, never varying... because the national interest is what we can test. At every election, it's always changing."

— [00:26:00.600 --> 00:27:17.320]

A critique of the foreign policy veto legislation that cancelled the Victorian BRI MOUs — but the target is the legislation's underlying assumption, not just its immediate application. An eternal flame does not change, does not respond to democratic contest, does not track shifting values. Allan's argument is constitutional: foreign policy in a democracy is not a fixed doctrine but a contestable public good that changes with governments and electorates. The legislation assumes otherwise — that there exists a single correct national interest that the Foreign Minister's office is entitled to enforce. The metaphor captures both the quasi-religious quality of the claim (an eternal flame is devotional, unchanging, sacred) and its political implausibility. He then adds: "the irony of responding to the authoritarianism of China with such authoritarianism of our own" — the irony is precise, not rhetorical flourish.

"Substitute Australia for New Zealand in that and tell me that it's not a rational and sensible statement of national policy"¶

"Substitute Australia for New Zealand in that and tell me that it's not a rational and sensible statement of national policy."

— [00:17:20.220 --> 00:19:51.240]

After quoting Mahuta's speech at length — its statement that NZ will raise human rights "in a consistent, country agnostic manner," speak out on Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and "make our decisions independently, informed by our values and our own assessment of New Zealand's interests" — Allan performs the substitution test. The effect is to reveal that the critics of Mahuta were not objecting to the policies (which are essentially identical to Australia's) but to the fact they were expressed nationally rather than as part of an Anglophone bloc. "Bemused by some of the criticism" — the bemusement is genuine. His analysis of the Five Eyes point is also precisely calibrated: "I simply don't believe that China is going to take more notice of a Five Eyes press release on Xinjiang and Hong Kong than national statements issued by the five governments." The joint statement approach reinforces Beijing's conviction that "Australia is operating as a proxy for the United States" — so it achieves the opposite of its stated goal.

Australia has no China strategy¶

"The New Zealand government seems to have a position on how to manage China, whereas it's hard to see, for me anyway, that the Australian government does... there's no strategy for managing here beyond doubling down on our traditional relationships with the US, UK, Japan, Five Eyes and new ones like India in the hope that this will deter China from reckless military action... he's got nothing really to say about how to manage the high probability that whatever we might hope for, China is not going to revert to being a stakeholder in an American-led system, nor about how we are going to handle that."

— [00:30:10.520 --> 00:32:13.520]

The bluntest formulation in the corpus to this point of his view on Australia's China policy failure. It is not that Australia isn't responding — he explicitly says "we aren't preoccupied with China in our defense, security, foreign policies." The failure is strategic: there is no account of what to do about the high-probability outcome that China does not revert to its pre-Xi stakeholder posture. The Morrison government's list of Indo-Pacific threats (territorial claims, military modernisation, foreign interference, cyber, disinformation, unfair trade rules) names China without naming it, but offers no answer to the question of what happens if those things continue. Allan endorses the deterrence objective as "certainly a good one" while calling it insufficient. The observation on Wang Xining's "cow to be milked" line is characteristic: "was a clever enough line. But there was actually a slightly uncomfortable truth to it" — he does not dismiss a Chinese diplomat's critique when it contains analytical content.

"The bumper sticker nature of much of what passes public discussion about China in Australia"¶

"I sometimes get a bit depressed by the bumper sticker nature of much of what passes public discussion about China in Australia. Commentators who know very little about China making huge generalizations about the country and its politics and its intentions, you know, the sort of Xi Jinping dictator for life stuff you see in newspapers, as though intra-party and regional politics aren't playing out in some form all over the country."

— [00:41:36.600 --> 00:43:16.600]

He prefaces this with a characteristic self-deprecating setup — "I'm going to share a secret, Darren" — which Darren punctures immediately ("Allan, you've never said this before?"). The frustration is genuine: the reduction of complex Chinese political dynamics to a single-actor dictatorship narrative obscures everything that matters for policy analysis. His response is characteristically practical: when the public discourse fails, he goes to primary scholarship — the Reischauer lectures by someone who "actually knows what they're talking about." The phrase "bumper sticker nature" is doing precise work: a bumper sticker is a simplification that fits a pre-existing groove, requires no engagement with complexity, and signals tribal affiliation rather than analytical engagement. He is naming a specific failure mode of media-political China commentary.

Self-correction on Biden's focus on Asia¶

"When he came to office, we may have even talked about this at the time — Biden's background had mostly focused on Europe, and that he was familiar with the politics of Europe. And I think I underestimated how consistent his administration's focus on Asia would be."

— [00:36:39.060 --> 00:38:24.040]

Third consecutive episode self-correction (Quad scepticism in Ep070; Rorty/human rights in Ep070; now Biden/Asia). The pattern is not random: Allan's willingness to revise in real time, on the record, is a methodological commitment. He earlier noted Biden's Europe background as a likely driver of administration posture; events have proved that calculation wrong. He says so directly, names the specific error (underestimating the Asia focus), and moves on. No hedging, no qualification — just the clean acknowledgement. This is the practitioner's discipline: analytical positions are held until the evidence moves them.

Biographical Fragments¶

No new career or personal biographical fragments emerge in this episode. The main biographical significance is methodological — Allan's response to public China discourse, and the third consecutive self-correction.

Style and Method Evidence¶

Self-correction discipline: Three consecutive episodes with candid, on-record revision of prior positions (Quad, Rorty, Biden/Asia). This is a pattern, not a coincidence. He holds positions until evidence moves them; when it does, he names the movement precisely.
Scholarship vs punditry: Rana Mitta's lectures — primary scholarly source from an Oxford expert — are sought as an antidote to "bumper sticker" commentary. His aesthetic preference is consistent: expertise over position-taking, complexity over simplification.
The substitution test: Quoting Mahuta's speech then saying "substitute Australia for New Zealand" is a signature analytical move — force the audience to apply the same standards to Australia that they apply to New Zealand, and the criticism collapses.
Compression: "The focus was on Japan, but the audience was China" — one sentence does the work of a paragraph. Present throughout the corpus; particularly concentrated in this episode.
Honest engagement with adversary arguments: Wang Xining's "cow to be milked" line — Allan notes "there was actually a slightly uncomfortable truth to it." He does not dismiss a Chinese diplomat's critique when it contains valid analytical content. This is the anti-partisan instinct: truth wherever it comes from.

Reading / Watching / Listening Segment¶

Rana Mitta — 2021 Reischauer Lectures, Harvard Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies¶

Context: Sought out as an antidote to "bumper sticker" China commentary. Available on YouTube and the Harvard Fairbank Center's podcast. Description: Three lectures by Rana Mitta (professor of the history and politics of modern China, Oxford), drawing on both Chinese and Japanese history, through the three themes of "newness, emotion and purpose." Allan's comment: "Really wonderful. You'd never guess these in advance, I think." Contrasts explicitly with "Xi Jinping dictator for life stuff" in newspapers that ignores intra-party and regional political dynamics. Reveals: When public discourse fails him, Allan goes to primary scholarship. His China reading is methodologically disciplined: he wants people who "actually know what they're talking about," not commentators with a position. The route to the recommendation (frustration with public discourse → active search for scholarly antidote) is itself revealing: he does not simply consume the ambient media environment but goes and finds better material. This is consistent with his general information discipline ("hunt and gather rather than be served a buffet" from Ep069).

Open Questions¶

The Longest Telegram: Darren recommends it; Allan endorses it ("I thoroughly endorse that"). Published 1 April 2021 on War on the Rocks, anonymously, as a parody/homage to Kennan's Long Telegram — a comprehensive grand strategy framework against China. Allan endorses without commenting on content. Does this thread develop?
Allan's view of Abbott's foreign policy: His characterisation of Abbott's Taren-Coutt speech as "moving" is the most positive thing he says about Abbott in the corpus to this point. Does Abbott appear elsewhere as a foreign policy actor, and how does Allan characterise him?
Rana Mitta: Does this scholar appear again? Allan's active pursuit of Mitta's lectures contrasts with his frustration at public commentary — does Mitta become a recurring reference?
Australia's China strategy gap: Allan says flatly Australia has no China strategy, only deterrence posture. Does he ever characterise Australia as developing one, in later episodes?