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Source — AITW Ep081 — Gary Quinlan (Part 2): Australia-Indonesia Relations; ASEAN; Future of Multilateralism

Episode Metadata

Field Value
Episode number 81
Title Ep. 81: Gary Quinlan (Part 2): Australia-Indonesia relations, ASEAN, and the future of multilateralism
Publication date 2021-08-28
Recording date Thursday, 5 August 2021 (same session as Ep080)
Guests Gary Quinlan
Allan present Yes — as host and interviewer, with substantive contributions
Format Long-form guest interview (Part 2 of 2); more Allan analytical voice than Part 1; topics: Australia-Indonesia bilateral; ASEAN and Myanmar; multilateralism and the rules-based order

Summary

Part 2 of the Gary Quinlan interview, with significantly more Allan analytical content than Part 1. Allan's framing of the multilateralism question produces the clearest statement of Australian foreign policy doctrine in the processed corpus. Quinlan explicitly confirms Allan's personal involvement in APEC — the most external validation of that biographical fragment yet. The exchange on ASEAN's Myanmar failure is sharp, with Allan pressing Quinlan past a diplomatic non-answer to the harder question. Allan also promotes an AIIA monograph, revealing his curatorial and intellectual role at the institution.

Biographical confirmation by a third party: Quinlan places Allan inside the APEC achievement — "APEC — Allan's there" — the first time a peer explicitly names him as personally involved rather than Allan placing himself there.

Key Quotations

The doctrine statement — rules-based order as Australian national interest

"Here in Australia, after a brief excursion down a Trumpian negative globalism side road, the current government has come back to the position of all Australian governments since the Second World War. That if you're a country of Australia's size and with our range of interests, you are always going to be better off in a system in which the rules — whether they're the rules of trade or warfare or the environment — are jointly developed and then followed, and in which Australia has played an active part in the shaping."

— [00:28:02.910 --> 00:30:12.990]

The clearest and most complete statement of Australian foreign policy doctrine in the corpus. Three elements: (1) the comparison class — Australia's size and interest range; (2) the mechanism — jointly developed and followed rules; (3) the qualification — Australia must play an active part in the shaping, not merely accept rules others write. The Trumpian parenthesis is characteristically framed as a "brief excursion down a side road" — an aberration, not a break, from the bipartisan consensus. Allan does not say the rules-based order is good because it is morally correct; he says it serves Australian interests because of what Australia is.

"APEC — Allan's there" — Quinlan confirms the biographical fragment

[Gary Quinlan, listing Australia's great diplomatic achievements]: "APEC — Allan's there — and was involved in many of those areas about the Bogor Goals and all the rest of it. The ASEAN Regional Forum, which Ali Alitas and Gareth Evans worked intimately on... The Cambodia peace settlement, again, Ali Alitas and Gareth Evans..."

— [00:20:38.270 --> 00:21:11.830] / [00:15:57.430 --> 00:20:38.270]

The first external confirmation of Allan's APEC involvement. In Ep078, Allan placed himself inside the "we" of APEC's formation; here, a peer names him directly as having been there. The Bogor Goals were agreed at the 1994 APEC leaders' summit in Indonesia — consistent with Allan's confirmed role in Keating's office by June 1994. Quinlan's framing pairs APEC (Allan's domain) with the ASEAN Regional Forum and Cambodia peace settlement (Evans's domain) — locating Allan in the same tier of 1990s Australian diplomatic achievement as Gareth Evans.

Reversing the usual lens — Australia seen from Jakarta

"I want to reverse the usual question here and ask you not to judge Australia's relations with Indonesia, especially given your recent role in it, but Indonesia's relationship with Australia... when their thoughts do turn southwards, how are we seen — as a partner, a threat, an irrelevance?"

— [00:00:31.070 --> 00:01:47.030]

Allan's structural opening move: instead of asking how Australia sees Indonesia, he asks how Indonesia sees Australia. The reversal is deliberate — the usual question reproduces the Australian perspective, while this one forces an external view. "A partner, a threat, an irrelevance" are the three possible categories, stated directly rather than as a rhetorical flourish. This is the same question design as his Indonesia worldview question in Part 1 — asking for the structural frame before the policy.

"I suspect you don't want to answer precisely" — peer pressure, dry

"Yeah, no, it doesn't answer precisely, Gary, but I suspect you don't want to answer precisely. So let me end with another question." [Gary Quinlan: "That's a first."] "Has ASEAN's performance during the Myanmar crisis surprised you?"

— [00:25:23.750 --> 00:25:43.510]

When Quinlan gives a discursive defence of ASEAN without directly addressing whether it can carry the weight of the world's expectations, Allan names the evasion dryly and pivots to the harder, specific question — Myanmar, where ASEAN was visibly failing. Quinlan's "That's a first" (i.e., being caught not answering precisely) is the banter of peer-level comfort. The Myanmar follow-up extracts a more candid assessment: "it's disappointing."

Multilateralism as counter-positioning — Quinlan's advice

"We're way beyond just being a country with which you can deal just bilaterally. We have a significant investment and contribution, which we actively do in the global system, which all countries are a part of... it reinforces our strategic position in relation to all of that."

— [00:30:13.710 --> 00:34:45.110]

Quinlan's answer to Allan's multilateralism question: multilateral engagement is not just norm-maintenance but a counter-positioning strategy — it prevents Australia from being isolated and pressured bilaterally (e.g., by China). Allan's doctrine statement and Quinlan's strategic argument are complementary: the same policy serves both interest-based and strategic purposes.

AIIA monograph — Allan's curatorial role

"As part of a series of monographs in which we try to throw light on aspects of diplomatic tradecraft, the AIIA is soon going to be publishing a short book by one of your colleagues in New York, Michael Bliss, dealing with Australia's most recent term on the UN Security Council and the legacy of that... I've read it a couple of times, but I reread it before this, and it's very hard to see much to be optimistic about in the conclusions you reach."

— [00:28:02.910 --> 00:30:12.990]

Allan describes the AIIA's "series of monographs on diplomatic tradecraft" — a publication programme he is steering. He has read Quinlan's afterword multiple times. This is the institutional curator role at the AIIA: commissioning, reading, and drawing out the implications of practitioner writing. The "very hard to see much to be optimistic about" is characteristically direct — he is not flattering the author.

Biographical Fragments

Evidence type: Confirmed by third party (significant)

  1. APEC involvement confirmed by Gary Quinlan — "APEC — Allan's there — and was involved in many of those areas about the Bogor Goals." The Bogor Goals were agreed at the November 1994 APEC summit in Indonesia — consistent with Allan's confirmed Keating's-office role (June 1994 onward). This is the first peer confirmation of the biographical fragment first disclosed by Allan himself in Ep078. (Ep081)

Evidence type: Reinforcing

  1. AIIA as active publisher of practitioner monographs — Allan is steering a "series of monographs on diplomatic tradecraft" at the AIIA. He has read Quinlan's afterword multiple times. This confirms the AIIA role as intellectual and institutional, not merely ceremonial. (Ep081)

Style and Method Evidence

  • Reversing the usual lens: opening with Indonesia's view of Australia rather than Australia's view of Indonesia — structural question design that forces the external perspective.
  • Naming the evasion: "I suspect you don't want to answer precisely" — peer-level directness, delivered without aggression. The pivot to Myanmar is immediate and sharp.
  • Doctrine framing before policy question: setting up the multilateralism question with a full doctrine statement, then inviting Quinlan to respond to it — using the guest to validate and extend his own analytical frame.
  • Institutional promotion without sycophancy: "it's very hard to see much to be optimistic about in the conclusions you reach" — honest engagement with a book he is promoting.

Open Questions

  1. The AIIA monographs on diplomatic tradecraft series — what other volumes exist or are planned? Does Allan commission or write others?
  2. Quinlan's point about Indonesia watching Australia's China handling as a calibration point: does this appear in later episodes when Australia-China relations worsen further?
  3. The proposed Australia-Indonesia-India trilateral partnership (maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean): does this develop in later episodes?
  4. Gareth Evans and the ASEAN Regional Forum / Cambodia connection — Quinlan pairs Evans with Indonesia's Ali Alatas as the joint architects. Does Allan discuss Evans's influence on his own thinking in later episodes?