Source — AITW Ep062 — A Wild Week in Australia-China Relations¶

Episode Metadata¶

Field	Value
Episode number	62
Title	A wild week in Australia-China relations
Publication date	2020-12-02
Recording date	Tuesday, 1 December 2020
Guests	None — Allan and Darren only
Allan present	Yes
Format	Emergency episode — no reading segment

Summary¶

Rapid-reaction emergency episode covering the "wild week" of late November–early December 2020 in Australia-China relations. Events recapped: (1) Chinese embassy in Canberra provides 14 grievances/points of friction to Australian journalists; (2) wine anti-dumping tariffs announced (tripling prices); (3) Zhao Lijian tweets fake/doctored image of Australian soldier apparently cutting Afghan child's throat; (4) Morrison demands an apology — China refuses and doubles down. Allan grades Australia's overall response: "I'd give us a pass mark." Praises Simon Birmingham again as "easily the best performer in government in responding on all these things." Criticises Morrison's demand for an apology as "tactically unwise." Key analytical point: "I'm always reluctant to assume that for any country at any time, there's a sort of central command center which is sort of manipulating all the levers of power." Notes the notable absence of the National Party from the China debate — historical contrast with National Party pressure to sell wheat even before diplomatic recognition. Wolf warrior diplomacy: "the overall damage it's doing to China's not only image but position in the world is very real." No reading segment; no new biographical fragments.

Key Quotations¶

"Gone further down the gurgler"¶

"I think now we've seen in the intervening time the relationship go further down the gurgler in a way that I wouldn't have thought was possible."

— [00:05:04.020 --> 00:06:52.340]

A colloquial phrase deployed in a moment of genuine analytical surprise. Allan is explaining why he changed his mind about doing an emergency podcast — the relationship deteriorated beyond what he had thought possible in the interval. "In a way that I wouldn't have thought was possible" is the significant clause: a practitioner with fifty years' experience in Australian foreign policy saying that events have exceeded his worst-case assessment.

"I'm always reluctant to assume that for any country at any time, there's a sort of central command center"¶

"I'm always reluctant to assume that for any country at any time, there's a sort of central command center, which is sort of manipulating all the levers of power around the system to achieve a certain outcome. I wouldn't say that here. But I do definitely think that there's an increasing tendency on Beijing's part to say, you know, damn it, this is what we think and we're going to say it."

— [00:22:07.340 --> 00:23:27.340]

A core analytical principle stated explicitly — possibly the clearest formulation in the corpus of his resistance to monocausal, conspiratorial readings of state behaviour. He applies it symmetrically to all countries, not just China. The "central command center" model (all actions are coordinated signals from a unified authority) is contrasted with the actual reality of bureaucratic behaviour, nationalist sentiment, and individual agency within systems. "I do definitely think" introduces the partial concession: Beijing is becoming more assertive and less disciplined — but not as a unified strategic plan.

"I'd give us a pass mark"¶

"I'd give us a pass mark."

— [00:08:27.580 --> 00:08:31.340]

Two weeks after grading Australia's China policy "more work to be done" (Ep058), Allan upgrades to "a pass mark" for the specific response to the November 2020 escalation events. He immediately explains the reasoning: Birmingham's responses were exactly right; the PM's London speech was not much of an olive branch; the demand for an apology was tactically unwise. "A pass mark" is deliberately positioned between Darren's 75/distinction and failure — it acknowledges adequate, not good, performance under difficult circumstances. Darren's dry response — "I wasn't asking for a grade" — shows the grading exercise has become a running joke.

"The overall damage it's doing to China's not only image but position in the world is very real"¶

"The wolf warrior diplomacy, you know, it's obviously reflects some popular sentiment in China, just as the nationalism here reflects popular sentiment. But I think the overall damage it's doing to China's not only image but position in the world is very real."

— [00:22:07.340 --> 00:23:27.340]

Allan's assessment of wolf warrior diplomacy as counterproductive — not as a value judgment but a strategic one. He symmetrises first: nationalism in Australia, nationalism in China, both reflect "popular sentiment." Then the verdict: the international cost to China's position is real. Consistent with his view across the corpus that China's behaviour in this period is generating the balancing coalition it is trying to prevent.

The National Party's absence from the China debate¶

"One is the absence from the debate of the National Party in the way in which we've been used to the National Party acting in Australian foreign policy over 70 years. So if you look back at the China relationship, well before we established diplomatic relations, because the McMahon government and the Menzies government were opposed to it, we were selling wheat as hard as we could. And that was because of pressure from the country party as it then was. The same with the way in which we've dealt with Iran as well. We've had a mission in Iran ever since the revolution, basically because of pressure from the National Party and its constituents. So that, I think, is a really interesting change in the dynamics of Australian policymaking at the moment."

— [00:13:43.340 --> 00:14:57.340]

Allan reads the political landscape with institutional depth. The National Party/Country Party has historically been the moderating force on anti-China policy — keeping wheat exports going under Liberal governments ideologically opposed to recognising the PRC. The Iran comparison is striking: Australia maintained a mission in Tehran throughout the post-revolutionary period because of National Party pressure from rural constituents with trade interests. That this force has gone quiet in 2020 is a structural change in Australian policymaking — with real policy consequences. Allan does not explain why the National Party has gone quiet; the observation itself is the analytical contribution.

Biographical Fragments¶

No new biographical fragments in this episode.

Note: Allan reveals his decision-making process about emergency podcasts — he holds off the 14 points episode because "I didn't know how much this was simply the embassy freelancing with public diplomacy and how much was coming from Beijing" and "I didn't know how the Australian government would react." This reveals his analytical habit: wait for the system to process an event before commenting. Give the episode time to develop.

Style and Method Evidence¶

Analytical caution before acting: Allan's explanation of why he initially resisted the 14 points emergency podcast is a window into his editorial judgment. He waited for the system to respond before assessing the event — characteristic patience under the pressure of a news cycle.
Calibrating the fake image: Allan distinguishes between the seriousness of an official tweeting the image (which warranted a response) and the claim that it was photorealistic (which he rejects — "you could see it wasn't meant to be real"). He resists the most alarming reading while affirming the principled response. Precision under pressure.
Birmingham praised twice in three episodes: Ep059 named Birmingham as managing China "with great skill"; here he is "easily the best performer in government in responding on all these things." Consistent, direct assessment of ministerial performance.
The apology demand critique: Allan's objection to Morrison demanding an apology is tactical rather than principled — it "turns the issue into a trial of strength for whether the Chinese will apologize or not, rather than him saying we are offended by this." The counter-formulation he offers is more effective diplomacy: express the principle without making the measurement of success a demand for submission.
No central command: The explicit statement of his anti-conspiratorial analytical principle — applicable to all countries — is a foundational methodological point. It connects to his broader resistance to monocausal accounts of state behaviour across the corpus.

Reading / Listening Segment¶

No reading/listening/watching segment — emergency episode format.

Open Questions¶

National Party and China: Is Allan's observation about the National Party's unusual silence in 2020 further developed in later episodes? The structural observation (rural trade interests as moderating force on China hawkishness) is important and historically grounded.
Darren's Guardian op-ed on WTO remedy: Darren mentions writing "an excellent op-ed for The Guardian" on whether the WTO process was the right approach to economic coercion. This should be recoverable in the Guardian archive, approximately November 2020.
The 14 grievances list: Did the full list make it into public record? Allan's analysis — some items are about how Australia framed positions, not the positions themselves — is significant and suggests he had read the list in full.