Source — AITW Ep019 — An Incoming Government Brief: What Will the Election Winner Face in the New Term?¶
Episode Metadata¶
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Episode number | 19 |
| Title | Ep. 19: An incoming government brief: What will the election winner face in the new term? |
| Publication date | 2019-05-15 |
| Recording date | Tuesday 14 May 2019 (four days before the 18 May federal election) |
| Guests | None (Darren and Allan only) |
| Allan present | Yes |
| Format | Structured three-chapter "incoming government brief" format; reading segment at close |
Summary¶
Recorded four days before the 18 May 2019 federal election (won, against predictions, by the Morrison Coalition government). The episode mimics the structure of real incoming government briefs, organised into three chapters: National Security structure, Donald Trump, and China. This episode contains a major biographical confirmation: Darren refers to ONI (formerly ONA) as "the agency you used to lead, Allan," confirming Allan as a former Director-General of the Office of National Assessments. He also confirms he ran the International Division in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The China section includes the episode's most revealing formulation: the "uncomfortable squeeze" between diverging US and Chinese interests, Allan's critique of the shallowness of bipartisan consensus on China, and the Gareth Evans "rao or kowtow" quip on media coverage.
Key Quotations¶
What an incoming government brief does¶
"The briefs are designed to do a number of things. First of all, to explain to the incoming minister, particularly if it's someone from the opposition, what the department she or he is responsible for is and does, how it's structured. Secondly, what the immediate issues facing the incoming government will be and how the policies of the party set out during the election campaign will be implemented."
— [00:01:50.740 --> 00:03:22.020]
Insider knowledge; Allan has been on both sides of this process.
The PM&C International Division (biographical)¶
"The way that we've traditionally done this in Australia is to utilise the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, which is also the Secretariat to Cabinet, to drive and coordinate that advice. I ran the International Division in that department for a while, and that was what we did. And I must say that I haven't seen a better way of doing it."
— [00:10:58.340 --> 00:11:51.860]
Direct, first-person confirmation. Allan ran the International Division in the Department of PM&C. The personal endorsement — "I haven't seen a better way of doing it" — is characteristic: the institutional solution he prefers is the one he operated himself.
White House NSC model doesn't transfer¶
"I just don't think that something like the White House model works in a Westminster system like ours. The members of the National Security Committee here are ministers, they're members of parliament in their own right. They're not appointed by the president and serving at his pleasure, as happens in the States, and they have their own portfolio departments and portfolio responsibilities."
— [00:10:58.340 --> 00:11:51.860]
Institutional comparative analysis. The distinction between Westminster ministers (politically accountable to parliament, with their own portfolio departments) and presidential NSC appointees (serving at presidential pleasure, without portfolio accountability) is the key structural difference that makes direct transfer impossible.
Coalition approach to Trump: keeping heads down¶
"If the coalition government is returned, they are well used to it by now. They would no doubt deny this, but from where I sit, the approach they have adopted has been one of basically keeping our head down and trying to sustain the ordinary governmental links between US at the working level through the administration."
— [00:15:02.580 --> 00:17:36.820]
"They would no doubt deny this" — Allan knows the diplomatic language that would be used publicly, and names the reality beneath it. "Keeping our head down" is not pejorative; it is a realistic description of small-power strategy under an unpredictable great-power.
Iran: Australia's distinctive position¶
"On both sides of Australian politics, we've endorsed the Iran nuclear deal almost alone among American allies. We've had an embassy in Tehran for most of the period since the Islamic revolution. In this part of the world, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, as we talked about last time, it's been Salafi jihadist terrorist groups motivated in many cases by Wahhabist clerics supported by Saudi Arabia, which have been the problem in this part of the world rather than Shia terrorist groups backed by Tehran."
— [00:15:02.580 --> 00:17:36.820]
Regional specificity: Australia's threat environment is Sunni extremism (Saudi-linked), not Shia extremism (Iran-linked). Therefore the US framing of Iran as the primary terrorism threat does not map onto Australian interests or experience. This is structural divergence, not just opinion.
The US-China contest in civilizational terms¶
"We now have, I notice, the Director of Policy Planning in the State Department couching the contest between the US and China in civilisation terms. She told Anne-Marie Slaughter, this is the first time we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian."
— [00:24:41.070 --> 00:26:16.590]
Allan quotes this without immediately commenting at length — but the citation is pointed. Framing the US-China competition in racial/civilizational terms is presented as evidence of how far the contest has drifted from rules-based-order framing toward something more elemental and concerning.
The "uncomfortable squeeze" (headline China message)¶
"For our incoming government brief, the message is that this is going to get harder as US and Chinese interests diverge and Australia is caught in an uncomfortable squeeze."
— [00:24:41.070 --> 00:26:16.590]
"Uncomfortable squeeze" is Allan's clearest single-phrase diagnosis of Australia's structural position by mid-2019. Not a crisis; not a choice; but a squeeze that will intensify as the two major powers diverge.
The bipartisan consensus is not rich enough¶
"Where I disagree is, I don't think what you call the bipartisan consensus on China is anywhere near rich and deep enough to sustain us through the trials ahead. There's still too much pretense involved, too little genuine engagement with the complexities of China, too little subtlety."
— [00:31:48.530 --> 00:32:57.380]
This is Allan pushing back against Darren's relative satisfaction with Australia's China policy. Allan's critique is not that the policy is wrong in direction — he endorses "clarity, consistency and calmness" — but that it lacks depth, honesty, and engagement with complexity. "Too much pretense" is a strong judgment.
Morrison's "friend/customer" distinction¶
"I'm pretty sure that Scott Morrison didn't mean quite so clumsily to draw a distinction, as he did during the campaign yesterday, I think, between what he called our friend, the United States and our customer China. I suspect that what he was trying to draw on was that Dennis Richardson distinction that we're friends to both, but now I only to one, but it was revealing, and we have to do better than this."
— [00:31:48.530 --> 00:32:57.380]
Allan is generous about Morrison's intent — "I'm pretty sure he didn't mean to be so clumsy" — but clear that the effect was damaging. The reference to "that Dennis Richardson distinction" points back to Ep011, where Richardson's formulation was discussed. "We have to do better than this" is firm.
The point of diplomacy¶
"The point is not to make shifts in positions. The point is to reach agreement, and that can involve making shifts in position."
— [00:35:35.940 --> 00:35:47.350]
A precise correction of Darren. The distinction matters: a government should not be in the business of shifting its positions as an end in itself (that is concession without purpose), but reaching agreement requires that both parties move. Allan insists on separating the means from the end.
Gareth Evans on media and Asia: rao or kowtow¶
"Gareth Evans used to say that the Australian media only had one story about any Australian government's relationship with Asia. It was either rao or kowtow. And that's still the same."
— [00:36:40.890 --> 00:36:59.780]
"Rao" (Mandarin for yelling/arrogance) vs "kowtow" (submission). Evans's formulation captures the binary framing that Allan has been resisting throughout the series: the media wants either confrontation or capitulation, not the complex middle ground of managed engagement. The fact that Allan invokes Evans here suggests he regards the problem as structural and long-standing, not a product of the current moment.
Adam Tooze: end of American century?¶
"The core of Tooze's argument in this piece is, and I'm quoting him here, it's a gross exaggeration to talk of an end to the American world order. The two pillars of its global power, military and financial, are still firmly in place... What has ended, Tooze says, is any claim on the part of American democracy to provide a political model."
— [00:37:15.780 --> 00:38:21.090]
Allan summarises Tooze selectively but usefully: US hard power (military, financial) remains intact; US soft power (democratic model) has collapsed. This maps onto his long-standing argument about the end of the liberal order as an ideational project, not a structural one.
Biographical Fragments¶
Evidence type: Confirmed — MAJOR DISCOVERY
- Darren: "the agency you used to lead, Allan, the Office of National Assessments, now called the Office of National Intelligence." This directly confirms Allan was Director-General of ONA (Office of National Assessments). ONA is Australia's all-source civilian intelligence assessment body, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. Director-General of ONA is one of the most senior intelligence/national security appointments in the Australian system. (Ep019)
- Allan ran the International Division in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. (Ep019 — directly stated)
Note on career reconstruction: The arc is now clearer: - ~1969: Graduate trainee, Department of External Affairs - Early career: Intelligence/national security work (Five Eyes area) - By June 1994: PM's office under Keating - At some point: Head of International Division, Department of PM&C - At some point: Director-General of ONA (later renamed ONI) - By 2018: AIIA National President; Honorary Professor, ANU
Style and Method Evidence¶
- Institutional preference rooted in personal experience: "I ran the International Division in that department for a while, and that was what we did. And I must say that I haven't seen a better way of doing it." His policy preferences are grounded in what he operated himself. Not theoretical.
- "They would no doubt deny this, but from where I sit...": names the gap between public language and operational reality, without contempt. He is not exposing hypocrisy; he is clarifying what the words obscure.
- Correction of Darren: the position/agreement distinction is precise and important — Allan will correct Darren when the framing is slightly off, even on minor points.
- Invoking Evans: the rao/kowtow formulation invokes a former Foreign Minister as an authority on the persistent problem of Australia's binary media framing of Asia policy. Allan uses historical figures as analytical shortcuts.
- Three C's reappear: "clarity, consistency and calmness" — stated in response to the China chapter question as his headline message. This formulation has appeared earlier in the series (Ep003).
Reading, Listening and Watching¶
Allan — Adam Tooze, "Is This the End of the American Century?" (London Review of Books)
"The two pillars of its global power, military and financial, are still firmly in place... What has ended, Tooze says, is any claim on the part of American democracy to provide a political model."
Tooze's Crashed (on the GFC) is also on Allan's reading list but not yet read as of this recording.
Open Questions¶
- When was Allan Director-General of ONA? Ep019 confirms the role but not the dates. This is the most senior institutional role confirmed in the corpus so far and places him at the apex of the Australian intelligence/national security system.
- The "Dennis Richardson distinction" on friends vs. allies — was this articulated explicitly in Ep011 or does it come from elsewhere in the corpus? Worth cross-referencing.
- Gareth Evans' "rao or kowtow" formulation — is this something Allan quotes from memory, or a published formulation by Evans? The casual attribution ("Evans used to say") suggests a phrase he heard in person.
- Allan has not read Crashed yet as of May 2019 — does he recommend it in a later episode once he has?