Source — AITW Ep006: Mike Pence's Hudson Institute Speech

Metadata

Field	Value
Episode	6
Title	Mike Pence's Hudson Institute speech and the state of Sino-US relations
Publication date	2018-10-18
Speakers	Allan Gyngell, Darren Lim
Guest	None
Duration	~32 min

Summary

This episode, devoted almost entirely to Mike Pence's October 2018 Hudson Institute speech, is one of the clearest early demonstrations of what makes Allan's analysis distinctive: the ability to place an apparently novel and alarming event within a familiar genre and then deliver the genuinely alarming verdict about what lies beneath it. His opening move is characteristic. The speech is "overblown, I think, in lots of places, but of a sort which is really quite familiar" — the same strategic direction-setting genre as Turnbull's China reset speech, just with different tone and content. The deflation is not dismissive; it is the practitioner's reflex of someone who has read hundreds of such speeches and knows how to distinguish their structure from their significance.

The significance, he argues, lies in the concept of "othering" — a term he had used the day before at the AIIA National Conference, prompted by a Foreign Affairs article Darren had passed him. The episode is a rare moment of intellectual traceability: Allan names the article, names his source, and traces the argument back to its academic origins before delivering his objection. Two respected liberal internationalist scholars had concluded that "othering" China — constructing it as the enemy — was the only way to rally American public support for liberal order. Allan's response is sharp and unhurried: "I don't think that that's the only way," and more importantly, it is dangerous, because "China is not the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The things that bind the two sides together are too dense." The alternative he proposes — "frame them with precision" — is not a slogan but a methodological commitment. Name the specific problems. Refuse the iron curtain.

Two smaller details in this episode are worth noting. Allan has been to Beijing twice in three weeks (episodes five and six), reporting on how Chinese analysts are receiving the new US posture. His first-person reporting — "it was hard to find the karma view anywhere" — is the fruit of sustained, direct engagement, not secondary analysis. And his self-deflation at the close is striking: when he notes that "the internationalists are people like you and me — we don't know, we don't matter a damn, really," he is not performing modesty. He is applying the same clear-eyed assessment to himself that he applies to everyone else. The recommendation closing the episode is equally characteristic: he turns not to academic writing but to Mike Morell's Intelligence Matters podcast — professionals who know the subject from the inside, offering "a non-Trumpian, non-Pencean, non-Boltonian view of the world informed by deep knowledge."

Key Topics

• Pence's Hudson speech: content, intended audience, authorship by VP not President
• The "failed bet" critique of engagement with China — and Allan's pushback
• The concept of "othering" authoritarian states (Cohen and Colgan in Foreign Affairs)
• Dangers of treating China as the new Soviet Union
• Three Chinese schools of thought: pessimistic, concerned, karma (none dominant in Beijing)
• Allan's second Beijing visit (within weeks of Ep005)
• Implications for Australia: trapped between diverging US and Australian positions
• The AIIA National Conference and its discussions

Key Quotations

On reading Pence's speech as strategic direction-setting

"It's no different, really, from the speech that Malcolm Turnbull gave at the University of New South Wales... essentially sending a message to the country concerned. You're also shoring up people back home, making sure that the rest of the government is acting in the same way. So it's a bit of strategic direction setting speech. Overblown, I think, in lots of places, but of a sort which is really quite familiar."

— Allan Gyngell [00:06:41.890]

Places Pence's speech in a familiar genre rather than treating it as unprecedented — demonstrating that he reads across political divides for structural similarities.

On why the VP gave the speech, not Trump

"It might also be that the president is trying to keep just a little bit of distance himself from the sort of policy articulated there so that he can preserve his own personal relationship with Xi Jinping. We know that President Trump attaches great importance to personal dealings, so he may just feel that this gives him a little more leverage than if he'd done it himself."

— Allan Gyngell [00:08:53.130]

Analyses Trump's use of the VP as a buffer — a practitioner's reading of how presidential latitude works.

On the "failed bet" on China engagement

"It's entirely unclear to me what other bet you could possibly have made at the time. If you're looking back at the turn of the century, China's reform program was really getting underway. It was joining the WTO. So Zhu Rongji as the premier was a well-known advocate of using external pressure as a way of reforming things inside China. And we all benefited from that. It's very hard for Australia to say it was a failed bet to make that assumption."

— Allan Gyngell [00:12:45.890]

"China has been a responsible stakeholder in elements of the international order which have suited it. So it's not binary."

— Allan Gyngell [00:13:05.570]

"It's not binary" — one of Allan's most repeated formulations. Resists all-or-nothing verdicts on China.

On "othering" China

"I read in an article you'd given me actually, Darren, from Foreign Affairs... [Cohen and Colgan] came to the conclusion that the only way of getting ordinary Americans to support the issues that the two academics believed in was to recreate a new Soviet Union."

— Allan Gyngell [00:15:14.890]

"I think it's a really dangerous approach for the United States to take because China is not the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The things that bind the two sides together are too dense. The consequences are very much more complex than they were when you had the very clear... economic division between the East and West during the Cold War."

— Allan Gyngell [00:15:14.890]

On how to frame disagreements with China correctly

"We should frame them with precision. We should frame them in a way which enables us to advance our own interests in dealing with them, but which doesn't construct China in this case as an entity with which you can't deal because it is other, because it is the enemy. You can say we've got lots of problems with you, China, on South China Sea or on what you're doing in cyber or the Belt and Road Initiative. No problem at all with that. It's just the metaphorical... descent of another sort of iron curtain between the two sides, that's the problem."

— Allan Gyngell [00:17:11.890]

Key methodological principle: precise, issue-by-issue engagement — not strategic othering. This is one of Allan's most sustained and important formulations.

On Chinese reactions (second Beijing visit)

"It was hard to find the karma view anywhere. So I think that... the attitudes ranged from concerns to pessimistic with pessimistic... There's a growing awareness in China that the things that you've been talking about, views in Washington generally, not just the Trump administration, darkening towards China... I don't think people have written off the possibility that things will get better... but I think there's a hunkering down in both places."

— Allan Gyngell [00:21:28.930]

"The internationalists are people like you and me. We don't know, we don't matter a damn, really."

— Allan Gyngell [00:21:28.930]

Self-deflating realism: the people who want cooperation don't hold power. This is a notably pessimistic note.

On Australia's diverging position from the US

"What Scott Morrison said was very similar to what Malcolm Turnbull said... 'Deep and abiding mutual respect, because above all, we're acutely aware of the strong fundamentals that we share.' Now, that's not what the Pence speech was saying."

— Allan Gyngell [00:24:10.390]

On the AIIA conference and health of Australian debate

"There's the government and the alternative government in Australia and both of them thinking carefully about the world... There's a great mix of young people and old people like me and gender in the debate. And so I thought it really showed the health of... the liveliness of the debate about Australia in the World."

— Allan Gyngell [00:29:30.010]

Genuine pride in the quality of Australian foreign policy debate; notable that he includes himself ("old people like me") without vanity.

Listening Recommendation

Allan recommends Mike Morell's Intelligence Matters podcast (featuring Chris Johnson on China):

"Mike Morell, a former acting director of the CIA and before that, the head of analysis there. And Chris Johnson, who's a very well known China scholar in the US... It's a very non-Trumpian, non-Pencean, non-Boltonian view of the world informed by deep knowledge. And it's always good to hear that sort of thing."

— Allan Gyngell [00:31:23.810]

Prefers intelligence professionals' analysis to political rhetoric. Values "deep knowledge" explicitly.

Evidence Relevant to Allan's Views

• The engagement/failed-bet debate: the bet was reasonable at the time and the benefits were real
• "It's not binary" — China is a mixed actor; must be evaluated issue by issue
• "Othering" China is dangerous because the relationship is structurally different from US-Soviet competition
• Australian and US positions on China are diverging, and this will create increasing difficulty
• The "internationalists" in China don't hold power — Allan is clear-eyed about this

Evidence Relevant to Allan's Style and Persona

• Reads across ideological divides: processes a Foreign Affairs piece by liberal internationalists critically
• Two Beijing visits in three weeks: hands-on intelligence-gathering
• Self-deflation: "old people like me"; "we don't matter a damn, really"
• Admires deep knowledge in intelligence professionals over political rhetoric
• Precision framing as an ethical and strategic obligation: "frame them with precision"

Biographical Fragments

• Gave a speech at the AIIA National Conference on the topic of "othering"
• Reads Foreign Affairs regularly; Darren has been passing him articles
• Listens to US intelligence/security podcasts to get non-political analysis

Characteristic Phrases

• "It's not binary"
• "Frame them with precision"
• "Overblown, I think, in lots of places"
• "Hunkering down in both places"
• "Old people like me"
• "We don't matter a damn, really"

Relevance to Central Biographical Question

Allan's concept of "framing with precision" — naming specific issues with China rather than constructing China as the enemy — is one of his most sophisticated contributions to Australian foreign policy discourse. It reflects both intellectual rigour and practical diplomatic experience. His self-deflation ("we don't matter a damn") is not despair but realistic self-assessment, which paradoxically makes his voice more authoritative: he has no illusions about his own power, yet continues to argue and engage.

Open Questions

• Does Allan's warning about "othering" China resonate with policy-makers? Does the podcast return to this theme?
• How does the AIIA conference shape the subsequent public debate on China policy in Australia?