Source — AITW Ep083 — Debating AUKUS: Deterrence, Sovereignty and Risk¶

Episode Metadata¶

Field	Value
Episode number	83
Title	Ep. 83: Debating AUKUS—Deterrence, sovereignty and risk
Publication date	2021-09-22
Recording date	Tuesday, 21 September 2021
Guests	None (Allan and Darren only)
Allan present	Yes
Format	Structured debate: Allan against AUKUS (AFR op-ed), Darren for it (SMH op-ed with Natasha Kassam). Topics: AUKUS as strategic concept; deterrence vs sovereignty; UK's role; China's reaction; Taiwan; France. Reading segment.

Summary¶

The first episode recorded after the AUKUS announcement (15 September 2021). Allan and Darren arrive with dueling op-eds — Allan's sceptical piece in the Australian Financial Review, Darren's supportive piece in the Sydney Morning Herald (co-authored with Natasha Kassam of the Lowy Institute). The episode is a structured debate in which Allan argues AUKUS is wrong in concept and Darren argues it is necessary and defensible.

Allan's core objection is not technical but strategic and philosophical: AUKUS "binds Australia inexorably and for the foreseeable future to a certain trajectory. Our options in the world are suddenly limited to a single track." He describes Darren's model as "physics" — fundamental IR principles applied with clarity — and his own as "biology": the messy contingency of actual foreign policy. He does not share Darren's zero-sum reading of the region's strategic future, insisting China will "always be operating in a region of other large and willful states." He reverses the sepia-tinted nostalgia accusation: it applies to Darren's view of the US, not Allan's view of China.

The French dimension draws genuine sharpness from Allan: he notes that Morrison was "deceiving or at the very least dissembling" before Macron, that DFAT appears to have had no involvement ("I've seen no reference anywhere"), and that Australia's diplomatic reputation "really is badly damaged." His final word is the most compressed: "I'm not as terrified as you... I know from [the Cold War] that we can manage and think our way out of danger. But for me, AUKUS takes us backwards."

This is the most fully articulated episode-length presentation of Allan's AUKUS position in the corpus.

Key Quotations¶

Fear of Abandonment — "most triumphant vindication"¶

"It's the most triumphant vindication of the book's title and central thesis that any author could hope for, Darren, so I was delighted."

— [00:04:02.740 --> 00:04:49.980]

Allan's first sentence after Darren's long AUKUS framing. The self-deprecating opening — authorial delight at being vindicated — immediately establishes that he does not intend to let the moment pass without noting it. The irony is pointed: the announcement that he thinks is wrong for Australia is the most perfect embodiment of the pattern his book describes.

"A very big aspiration" — first assessment¶

"I would describe it as a very big aspiration, which, if it comes off, would deeply change Australia's international relationships and role. I don't think it's a positive development, and we'll talk about that, but I certainly wouldn't minimise its significance."

— [00:04:02.740 --> 00:04:49.980]

Characteristically careful first framing: he has "changed my mind several times now about how big a deal this is." He refuses to minimise; he refuses to endorse. The phrase "very big aspiration" is precisely calibrated — it acknowledges transformative potential while embedding a condition ("if it comes off") that the announcement did not.

"Biology, if you like... more like physics"¶

"I come to it first through the perspective of the messy contingency of foreign policy, biology, if you like. And you start from the clarity of fundamental principles of IR, more like physics."

— [00:11:36.740 --> 00:13:18.740]

The most explicit methodological self-description in the corpus. Allan is not criticising Darren's approach — he endorses the mutual respect and regards the difference as genuine. Biology names his method: organisms, contingency, context-dependence, evolution. Physics names Darren's: underlying structural laws, model-building, predictions from first principles. The distinction maps onto the practitioner/theorist divide Allan has noted elsewhere, but here it is stated directly about the two hosts.

"State in free association" — a security professional's view of the future¶

"I was talking recently to a group of Australian military and security folk about grand strategy. And I asked all of them for their views about the future. One of them said to me that the only option for Australia was to become what he called a state in free association with the United States. Now, I'm not sure if he meant it this way, but that's the sort of relationship outsourcing defense that the US has with the federated states of Micronesia or Palau. At the time, I thought, well, that's a rather dramatic response to Australia's position. But as it turned out, maybe not."

— [00:11:36.740 --> 00:13:18.740]

A concrete recent interaction with security professionals — Allan regularly engages this community and uses specific exchanges to anchor abstract analysis. The "free association" framing (Micronesia, Palau) is sharp: it names the logical terminus of AUKUS-style integration. "At the time, I thought... maybe not" is characteristic Allan understatement: the concession is real, but the implicit objection is not withdrawn.

"Binds Australia inexorably... a single track"¶

"The single worst thing about this decision, if it comes off, is that it binds Australia inexorably and for the foreseeable future to a certain trajectory. Our options in the world are suddenly limited to a single track."

— [00:11:36.740 --> 00:13:18.740]

The core objection, stated plainly. Allan throughout the corpus has defended Australia's strategic flexibility — the capacity to make policy choices not pre-determined by alliance dependency. AUKUS, in his view, forecloses that. "Inexorably" and "single track" are chosen to signal irreversibility; the conditional "if it comes off" is not optimism but epistemic honesty — the aspiration is large and many conditions must be met.

The UK brings nothing ANZUS couldn't¶

"They bring nothing that couldn't have been achieved equally well under an ANZUS banner, but with the added complication of branding US as the junior partner in an Anglosphere grouping made very explicit by Boris Johnson's reference to his kindred in Australia."

— [00:14:22.740 --> 00:14:44.740]

Two claims compressed: (1) the UK's addition is substantively redundant — everything AUKUS offers was achievable bilaterally under ANZUS; (2) the UK's addition carries a specific cost — it visually brands Australia as an Anglosphere junior, with Johnson's "kindred" language making it undeniable. The word "kindred" is not glossed; Allan treats it as self-evidently problematic to anyone who has watched Australia's decades-long effort to position itself in Asia rather than in a post-imperial British orbit.

"By multilateralizing, you just mean throwing the Brits into the mix"¶

"By multilateralizing, you just mean throwing the Brits into the mix."

— [00:16:17.740 --> 00:16:22.740]

One sentence. Six words after "you just mean." Deflates Darren's theoretical vocabulary ("multilateralizing the hub-and-spoke model") to its operational reality. Not an unfair characterisation — it is precisely what has happened. The comic bathos is the analysis.

Does the region not know its own interests?¶

"So in your view, the other countries of the region either don't know their own interests or are too scared to assert them. So when they talk about their desire and confidence that they can manage their relations with both the US and China in an equilibrium, that's not valid?"

— [00:15:10.740 --> 00:15:32.740]

Socratic method: identifying the implicit condescension in Darren's model. If ASEAN states are capable actors managing their strategic environment and still choose not to join AUKUS, one must either explain why they are wrong or accept their strategic judgement. Allan is not endorsing their approach; he is insisting their judgement be taken seriously rather than dismissed as fear or ignorance.

Sepia-tinted nostalgia — reversed¶

"People of my generation, as you've reminded me from time to time, are sometimes accused, wrongly, I believe, of thinking about China through a sort of sepia-tinged glow of nostalgia. Aren't you in danger of doing the same with the US?"

— [00:27:52.120 --> 00:29:02.740]

A rhetorical reversal of the standard criticism of Allan's generation. Then immediately grounds it: a Brookings piece that morning, asking whether the US is headed for another civil war. The claim is structural, not partisan — the question being asked by a centrist DC institution is itself the evidence. "Just think about that. Not about whether you agree or disagree, but that a think tank like Brookings... even feels the need to publish something like that."

Not zero-sum — "large and willful states"¶

"I simply don't see the strategic situation in the region in the zero sum terms that you just expressed. You seem to point to a world in which we... are inexorably heading to a point where overwhelming Chinese power will force us into a situation where we can exercise, as you put it, zero power and the rest of the region become zombies. Now, I think China is highly likely to go to a point where it is the largest economy in the world by any measure. But I think it will always be operating in a region of other large and willful states, including the United States and Japan, India and the rest of us. And it will be entirely possible for individual states within that area to resist the sort of dominance that you talked about."

— [00:30:41.740 --> 00:31:45.740]

His structural rebuttal to Darren's deterrence model. He accepts China's relative rise but refuses the inference — that a larger China means a dominated region. "Large and willful states" is the key phrase: Japan, India, the US, and others have the capacity and the interest to resist dominance regardless of whether Australia has nuclear submarines. The "zombies" formulation names — slightly satirically — where Darren's model ends up if taken to its conclusion.

Taiwan — "the same way we try to change lots of things in the world"¶

"Well, the same way we try to change lots of things in the world, you know, from whaling to the Uighurs. That is, through constant pressure, in this case, by moves to engage Taiwan more openly, short of diplomatic recognition, by sanctions, if necessary. One of the few things I'm sure of in international relations is that if Taiwan were to declare its independence, whatever the military deterrence in place, the Chinese government would respond militarily because that really would be perceived as a serious challenge to CCP control on the mainland."

— [00:42:05.740 --> 00:42:57.740]

Allan's positive case for alternatives to military deterrence on Taiwan. The whaling-to-Uighurs range of comparisons is deliberately wide: constant pressure through multiple non-military channels has changed state behaviour. He is not dismissive of the Taiwan risk — he describes a declaration of independence as genuinely explosive — but he refuses the narrowing of options to deterrence alone. The "few things I'm sure of" construction is characteristic: he states certainties sparingly, which makes them stand out.

"Haven't you fallen into the trap"¶

"And haven't you fallen into the trap of assuming that the only way countries can be deterred is by big, powerful war machines?"

— [00:41:22.580 --> 00:41:52.740]

A pointed question at the limit of the Taiwan discussion. Allan has been pressing for the non-military dimension throughout; this names the underlying epistemic assumption he is challenging in Darren's model. The "trap" framing is mild but deliberate — it implies a common error, not a unique failing.

France — DFAT excluded; "deceiving or at the very least dissembling"¶

"I've seen no reference anywhere to DFAT having been involved in any of this is the way it happens stories."

— [00:52:11.070 --> 00:52:16.740]

"Morrison deceiving or at the very least dissembling in front of Macron just before all this happened. Diplomatic reputation really is badly damaged, I think."

— [00:47:18.740 --> 00:48:22.740] (paraphrase of context; second quote from same passage)

Two distinct observations: (1) DFAT's institutional exclusion — the diplomatic machinery was not run through the department; (2) personal deception of a counterpart head of state. Allan calls out the Barnaby Joyce framing ("the bastards just don't appreciate all that the Aussies did for them in the First World War") with mock irony before turning serious. "Deceiving or at the very least dissembling" is the bluntest personal characterisation of Morrison in the corpus to this point.

"Super duper" — on nuclear proliferation¶

"Super duper, yeah. If we want to encourage nuclear proliferation throughout the region and add that to the existing list of the consequences of climate change and great power conflict."

— [00:35:11.740 --> 00:35:28.740]

Dry dismissal of the proposition that Australia should acquire independent nuclear weapons. The "super duper" is sarcastic acceptance — the fullest expression of his anti-proliferation position delivered as irony. He then immediately shifts from irony to earnest: "Now, I think we can both agree... that's not the way forward. Well, maybe we can't agree." The trailing qualification is honest — he does not assume Darren shares the view.

"AUKUS takes us backwards" — final word¶

"I need to say, Darren, that I'm not as terrified as you by what you describe as the deterioration of Australia's security situation. I see growing Chinese power, both economic weight and military capability... I'm not as sensitised as you to the end of the geopolitical nirvana of the recent decades because I remember the terrible risks of the Cold War as well. And I know from that that we can manage and think our way out of danger. But for me, AUKUS takes us backwards."

— [00:55:02.740 --> 00:56:21.390]

The closing statement. Allan claims the Cold War as his reference point — he has lived through a more dangerous period and knows it was navigable. "Geopolitical nirvana" is his characterisation of Darren's framing of the recent decades, not his own nostalgic view. "I know from that that we can manage and think our way out of danger" — this is the practitioner speaking: solutions are not predetermined by structural forces; minds and institutions shape outcomes. "But for me, AUKUS takes us backwards" — six words as verdict. He adds a caveat on the submarines themselves ("in some circumstances... the loss of sovereignty involved may only be relatively greater than with the joint strike fighters, it's still much more obvious") — even in disagreement, he distributes the analysis carefully.

Style and Method Evidence¶

Explicit methodological self-description — "biology, if you like... more like physics" is the clearest statement in the corpus of what distinguishes his approach from a model-driven IR scholar. He is not disparaging Darren's method; he is naming genuine difference.
Socratic questioning — "Do we agree that...?" used systematically to secure or surface disagreement on premises before conclusions. Counted instances: at least five rounds in this episode.
Deflation of theoretical vocabulary — "by multilateralizing, you just mean throwing the Brits into the mix." Takes Darren's jargon and reduces it to its operational content in one sentence.
Barnaby Joyce joke, immediately retracted — "No, no, it's just the frogs..." then "Allan!" — one of the very rare moments of outright comedy in Allan's register, followed by genuine seriousness.
Cold War memory as calibrating reference — Allan does not share Darren's terror because he has a longer baseline. This is epistemic, not reassuring: the Cold War was worse, and it was managed.
Not-zero-sum as structural conviction — he returns to it multiple times across the episode; it is genuinely foundational, not a debating point.
"I don't think it's a positive development... but I certainly wouldn't minimise its significance" — characteristic double-move: resists the urge to dismiss the scale while withholding endorsement.

Biographical Fragments¶

Evidence type: Reinforcing (recent interaction)

Australian military and security community engagement — "I was talking recently to a group of Australian military and security folk about grand strategy." Allan continues to be a regular interlocutor within the defence and security community, not just external commentary. This is consistent with his AIIA role and ONA background but confirms the engagement as current (September 2021). (Ep083)

Reading, Listening and Watching¶

Allan — Three readings on Xi Jinping and "common prosperity"

"If I've learned one thing from you, Darren, it's the importance of domestic drivers in foreign policy. See, I am listening. So we certainly need to understand what's going on on the home front. And I just wanted to mention three things that I read in the past week addressing the interesting combination of developments going on in Beijing at the moment."

— [00:56:26.740 --> 00:57:37.740]

"What to Make of China's Drive Towards Common Prosperity" — ANU colleagues (unspecified)
Kevin Rudd, Asia Society speech — "Xi Jinping's Pivot to the State"
Sinica Podcast — "What's the Deal with the Red New Deal?" — Kaiser Kuo and Jeremy Goldkorn interviewing Lizzie Lee and Jude Blanchett (CSIS). "For a more relaxed discussion, you know, while you're walking or on the treadmill."

Allan's acknowledgement of learning from Darren on domestic political drivers is genuine — it recurs across episodes. The three sources are all focused on the Xi-era state turn: crackdown on tech companies, common prosperity rhetoric, political tightening. Characteristic information-gathering: ANU scholarly output, a major public intellectual speech, and a specialist podcast — three different registers all on the same analytical question.

Open Questions¶

Does Allan's "biology vs physics" formulation appear elsewhere in the corpus — before or after this episode? It feels like a considered formulation, not an improvisation.
Does Allan develop his non-zero-sum regional argument ("large and willful states") in later episodes, particularly as China-Taiwan tensions increase in Ep101?
How does Allan's AUKUS position evolve? This episode is his first full articulation. Does he move at all across Ep084, Ep087, and beyond?
The India-France-Australia trilateral is mentioned and described as one of the Morrison government's valuable innovations — "I thought, one of the most sort of interesting and valuable innovations of the Morrison government." Does this trilateral appear elsewhere as a positive counter-example in Allan's analysis?
Allan notes he has published an op-ed in the AFR on AUKUS. Does the op-ed's specific arguments appear more precisely calibrated than what is discussed here?