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Source — AITW Ep104 — 20th Party Congress; Export Controls; Australia-Japan

Episode Metadata

Field Value
Episode number 104
Title Ep. 104: 20th Party Congress; export controls; Australia-Japan
Publication date 2022-11-12
Recording date Wednesday, 9 November 2022
Guests None (Allan and Darren only)
Allan present Yes
Format News episode after a six-week gap: 20th Party Congress; US semiconductor export controls; Australia-Japan Joint Declaration; summit season preview. Reading segment at close.

Summary

The episode opens with Allan's account of three weeks in Southern France and Venice — "hedonistic enjoyment" with "no serious side." He had never been to either place, was "a bit sceptical before we set off," and singles out Anselm Kiefer's installation at the Doge's Palace at the Venice Biennale as "really worth going all that way just to see." The Kiefer reference is not casual — a German artist whose work engages with historical memory, mythology, and the weight of the past; Allan's feeling for this work is of a piece with his own historical imagination.

The analytical centrepiece is a rare and striking public self-correction. On the Biden semiconductor export controls, Allan states plainly: "I've been arguing for some time, including possibly on the podcast, that the China-US relationship wasn't like the Cold War and that containment, however you define it, was not possible or desired by the United States. But I now think I was wrong." No hedging, no gradual revision — a direct withdrawal. It is one of the very few moments in the corpus where Allan explicitly abandons a prior position.

The Japan section contains two characteristically Allan moments. First, a detailed historical timeline from 1990 to 2014 demonstrating that Australia-Japan security cooperation is bipartisan and decades-old — his habitual resistance to presentism. Second, the "paragraph 30" vignette: he reads the nuclear non-proliferation language in the joint statement and declares the podcast "a safe space" in which he can say how much he values it "without being laughed at by others." The self-deprecating framing barely conceals genuine conviction.

Key Quotations

"I now think I was wrong" — the self-correction on containment

"I've been arguing for some time, including possibly on the podcast, that the China-US relationship wasn't like the Cold War and that containment, however you define it, was not possible or desired by the United States. But I now think I was wrong. This decision is certainly contemporary containment, an effort not to out-compete China, but to institute concrete steps to cut it off from the most important tools of both military and economic competition and to back them up."

— [00:14:44.040 --> 00:16:57.640]

One of the very few explicit withdrawals in the corpus. Allan does not say "I'm revising my view" or "the situation has evolved" — he says "I was wrong." The Biden semiconductor export controls changed the evidence; Allan updated the conclusion. "Including possibly on the podcast" adds an extra layer of accountability: he is not sure exactly when he said it, but he is owning the record. This is the practitioner's intellectual honesty — his job is to analyse accurately, not defend previous positions.

Coercion as "common, ancient and unsurprising"

"I've said on the podcast several times before that I think about coercion as a common, ancient and unsurprising element of international relations. History is littered with examples from every powerful state. And this seems to me just one of many examples of coercive behavior by the United States. Now, I emphasize here that I'm not being critical. It just seems natural to me."

— [00:14:44.040 --> 00:16:57.640]

"I'm not being critical. It just seems natural to me." The de-moralising of coercion is not cynicism but the practitioner's insistence on accurate categorisation. He immediately adds that this doesn't "let the Chinese off the hook" — the symmetry is principled, not relativist. His actual objection to China's trade sanctions is not that they are coercive but that they "break commitments China has made under the WTO and the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement." Cut through the moral framing, find the actual rule violation, argue from there.

"Paragraph 30" — nuclear disarmament as the safe topic

"I regard this podcast as a safe space, Darren, in which I can make comments about how much I like reading paragraph 30 in a joint statement like this without being laughed at by others."

— [00:31:21.040 --> 00:34:04.040]

Paragraph 30 of the Albanese-Kishida joint statement addressed "the catastrophic consequences of nuclear warfare and the need for non-proliferation and disarmament" — language, Allan notes, that "would probably not have appeared in an ANZUS statement." His warmth for this paragraph is not ironic; the "safe space" framing is how he handles genuinely held convictions that are unfashionable in his professional community. The nuclear disarmament thread runs from the Cold War deterrence thinking in Ep103 directly to this moment.

"The job of foreign policy" — options, not outcomes

"It's the job of foreign policy to ensure that in whatever unpredictable directions international politics moves, our country always has options and doesn't find itself compelled to move in one particular way."

— [00:38:19.040 --> 00:38:36.040]

One of the most compressed and portable formulations in the corpus. Foreign policy is not about achieving outcomes — it is about preserving optionality. "Doesn't find itself compelled to move in one particular way" is the negative definition: the failure condition is constraint. This underlies his entire worldview — the multilateralist case, the rules-based order case, alliance management — all ultimately rest here: preserve options, resist compulsion.

Biographical Fragments

New

  1. Three weeks in Southern France and Venice — "hedonistic enjoyment," no professional purpose; had never visited either place; sceptical beforehand; Anselm Kiefer at the Doge's Palace at Venice Biennale singled out as "really worth going all that way just to see." (Ep104)

  2. Public self-correction on containment — "I now think I was wrong" — explicitly withdraws prior analysis that China-US relations were not Cold War-like and that containment was not possible. Triggered by Biden semiconductor export controls. (Ep104)

  3. Conceived the AIIA's "Week in Australian Foreign Affairs" column — Darren attributes the idea directly to Allan; now written by Isabella Keith on Australian Outlook. Allan: "Me too, congratulations to Isabella." (Ep104)

  4. George Packer's Our Man and Assassin's Gate both read — Our Man "recommended on the podcast a couple of years ago"; both books named with confidence. (Ep104)

Reinforcing

  1. Australia-Japan security continuity as practitioner's long memory — 1990 defence minister meetings, 1995 Keating Joint Declaration, 2008 Rudd agreement, 2014 Abbott Special Strategic Partnership, 2011 RAA negotiations — bipartisan and decades-old. (Ep104)

  2. Coercion as "common, ancient and unsurprising" — consistent with prior episodes; symmetry principle applied to US as well as China. (Ep104)

  3. Nuclear disarmament as genuine conviction — "paragraph 30" warmth; "safe space" framing of unfashionable positions. Consistent with Ep103 Cold War deterrence thread. (Ep104)

Style and Method Evidence

  • "I now think I was wrong": public, unhedged withdrawal of prior position — the analyst's intellectual honesty, not the diplomat's face-saving.
  • "Now I just made that up Darren, but I think it's probably true": spontaneous intellectual generalisation flagged transparently — hypothesis offered with appropriate modesty.
  • "A safe space": wry register for genuine convictions that are unfashionable; used for nuclear disarmament enthusiasm.
  • "On a more sober note": mode-switch marker from pleasure (Venice, film) to serious content.
  • Historical timeline as argument: 1990–2014 Australia-Japan sequence deployed to resist the claim that current alignment is merely reactive to Xi Jinping.

Reading, Listening and Watching

Allan — Everything Everywhere All at Once; Michael Wesley (Lowy Interpreter); George Packer, "On Democracy's Frontline" (The Atlantic, October 2022)

"I finally got to see Everything Everywhere All at Once... It has many surprising things to say about the immigrant experience, married life, mother father and mother daughter relationships and free will... Both Everything Everywhere, All at Once and Packer's reporting from Ukraine are reminders that almost everything with serious intent being created by Americans these days also addresses at some deeper level the state of America itself. Now I just made that up Darren, but I think it's probably true."

— [00:42:45.040 --> 00:44:59.040]

Caught on the long-haul flight — characteristically, downtime becomes cultural input. The film description is precise and sympathetic: the "wonderful Michelle Yeoh," the IRS audit, the multiverse, "free will." The spontaneous generalisation about American cultural production is the most interesting moment: everything serious being made by Americans is about America. "I just made that up" is not false modesty — it is the honest flag that this is a hypothesis, not a researched claim. The same intellectual move he makes in analysis: generate the insight, then hold it lightly.

Open Questions

  1. Allan says "I now think I was wrong" on containment — does he trace when he first said the opposite in the corpus? Does the revised view hold, or does it shift again?
  2. The Kiefer installation at the Doge's Palace — does Allan mention Kiefer or contemporary art elsewhere in the corpus? This is the clearest indication of genuine engagement with contemporary visual art.
  3. "The podcast is a safe space" for unfashionable convictions — does Allan use this framing elsewhere? Is nuclear disarmament the only topic?
  4. George Packer's Our Man was recommended "a couple of years ago" — which episode? Can this be verified?
  5. The AIIA's weekly column was Allan's idea — does he describe AIIA's institutional development more broadly elsewhere?