Source — AITW Ep067 — NZ-China-Australia; Myanmar; Xi's WEF Speech; Australia-Malaysia CSP¶

Episode Metadata¶

Field	Value
Episode number	67
Title	NZ-China-Australia; Myanmar; Xi's WEF speech; Australia-Malaysia CSP
Publication date	2021-02-06
Recording date	Thursday, 4 February 2021
Guests	None — Allan and Darren only
Allan present	Yes
Format	Regular news episode — four items plus reading segment

Summary¶

Four items: (1) New Zealand Trade Minister Damian O'Connor's comments advising Australia to "show more respect" to China — Allan distinguishes poor diplomacy from a legitimate underlying point about mutual respect, and offers a structural analysis of why Australia and New Zealand handle the relationship differently; (2) Myanmar military coup — Allan invokes de Maistre's aphorism and immediately rejects it as "particularly unfair to the Burmese," delivers a precise verdict on Aung San Suu Kyi, and draws on the emotional register of his first diplomatic posting; (3) Xi Jinping's WEF/Davos speech — Allan reveals his speech-reading methodology explicitly, distinguishing how he reads Chinese leaders from Australian or American ones; (4) Australia-Malaysia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership — Allan's characteristic skepticism about label inflation: "labelling things is only a start, not a destination."

Biographical significance: Myanmar connection revisited — Allan's personal affection for the Burmese people is audible ("fantastic people"). His speech-reading methodology is made explicit for the first time: rhetoric first, then content; Chinese speeches treated as authoritative; English translation prevents him from judging rhetorical effectiveness.

Key Quotations¶

"Australia feels economically confident but strategically vulnerable"¶

"It's always seemed to me that the biggest difference between Australia and New Zealand, two countries which are on the surface at least very similar, is that Australia feels economically confident but strategically vulnerable, while New Zealand feels strategically confident but economically vulnerable. And that's not surprising given our different geographic positions and economic endowments."

— [00:10:54.940 --> 00:12:18.640]

This is an analytical crystallisation of a bilateral contrast that could otherwise sprawl into pages. Allan compresses Australia's relationship to geography and power into two clean inversions. New Zealand's remoteness is a strategic asset (nothing vital to fight over, no threatening neighbour); its small economy is a vulnerability. Australia's resource base and size give it economic confidence; its proximity to Asia and reliance on the US alliance create the strategic anxiety. The formulation also explains the asymmetry of each country's diplomatic behaviour without blaming either: Australia is loud because it is anxious; New Zealand is careful because it is small and cannot afford to choose enemies. The structure is: observable behavioural difference → structural explanation → neither side is simply wrong.

Context: Allan has just conceded "I think we are too condescending and the New Zealanders can be too sensitive. So both things apply." The structural analysis comes immediately after the human diagnosis — characteristically, he does not leave the interpersonal verdict hanging but grounds it in the logic of the two countries' situations.

"She was a fine martyr, but a very poor politician"¶

"There's an old aphorism from the 18th century French philosopher and diplomat, Joseph de Maistre, to the effect that every country gets the government it deserves. Now, I don't think it's ever been really true, but it's always seemed to me to be particularly unfair to the Burmese who are fantastic people, but who have suffered under military regimes that were simultaneously repressive and incompetent since 1962... the West projected onto Aung San Suu Kyi its own romantic expectations. And it turned out that she was a Burman nationalist in the tradition of her father, Aung San... she was a fine martyr, but a very poor politician, unable or unwilling at least to convert her popularity among the people into a lasting change of governance. So my initial response is just one of great sadness for the Burmese themselves as they find themselves on this wheel again."

— [00:14:31.680 --> 00:16:39.420]

Three things are happening here simultaneously. First, the deployment of de Maistre: Allan reaches for an eighteenth-century French aphorism not to use it but to reject it — the citation is a setup for the moral rebuttal. That he knows de Maistre ("philosopher and diplomat") without hesitation places him in the tradition of practitioners who read the classics of statesmanship. Second, "fantastic people" — this is not diplomatic generality but emotional affect rooted in the two to three years he spent in Burma as a young diplomat (Ep064). He knew the country from the inside, in the period immediately following Ne Win's 1962 coup. The sadness is personal. Third, the Suu Kyi verdict: "a fine martyr, but a very poor politician" is a complete analytical sentence. It concedes what made her extraordinary (moral courage under house arrest) while naming the precise failure (inability to convert popularity into institutional change). The formulation resists both the hagiographic and the revisionist accounts.

Reading Chinese speeches: rhetoric first, then content¶

"I must say that they normally seem too ponderous to read through in full detail. So, I guess I read them differently in two ways. First of all, I assume in a way that I don't with all speeches by Australian or even American leaders, that they are authoritative. That is, that their content has been carefully worked over, and that they represent the one Chinese view... And secondly, because I'm reading them in English, I can't judge whether they're effective rhetoric, which is, you know, how I normally first go through a speech. I think, oh, that sounds really good. And then I look at the content... maybe win-win situation sounds better in Mandarin."

— [00:26:29.840 --> 00:29:33.300]

This is among the most methodologically explicit moments in the corpus — Allan articulates in real time how he reads political speeches. The method has two steps: first, assess the rhetoric; second, examine the content. The rhetorical first impression matters because effective rhetoric signals a live policy communication, not a pro forma recitation. With Chinese leaders, he cannot do step one: the English translation strips out the rhetorical texture. "Maybe win-win situation sounds better in Mandarin" is genuinely self-deprecating — he is acknowledging a real limitation on his analytical range, not performing modesty. The distinction between Australian/American speeches (parsing for internal politics, assessing who is addressed and what the speaker hopes to achieve domestically) versus Chinese speeches (treated as authoritative and unified) reflects fifty years of professional reading of government documents: he knows exactly what work a speech is doing in different political systems.

The observation that "there are large chunks of it, which only slightly rewritten could have come from the stump speech of many Australian prime ministers" is the practitioner's move: instead of writing off Xi's multilateralist language as pure propaganda, he asks what it might mean that Chinese leaders and Australian prime ministers are saying the same things about multilateralism. The challenge for Western statecraft, he argues, "is to work out what he meant, what we mean when we say similar things, and where any common ground might be."

"If you want simple answers, don't come looking for them around here"¶

"Here we are back with foreign policy and its role of balancing interests and values and managing differences. If you want simple answers, don't come looking for them around here, Darren, is my advice."

— [00:21:55.040]

Delivered after a long passage working through the tensions in how to respond to the Myanmar coup: values demand condemnation; interests demand engagement; Washington's moral authority is diminished; ASEAN solidarity constrains collective action; isolation drives the junta toward China. Allan names the structure (balancing interests and values, managing differences) and then declines to resolve it — because the point is that foreign policy is constitutively about the management of that tension, not its dissolution. The joke is characteristic: self-aware about the pedagogical disappointment of the answer, but the disappointment is the honest answer.

"Labelling things is only a start, not a destination"¶

"I hope this one with Malaysia does better than its Chinese counterpart. And that's a reminder that labelling things is only a start, not a destination."

— [00:33:19.220]

Pithy verdict on diplomatic label inflation. Australia has a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China (signed 2013) and has just added one with Malaysia. The Malaysia announcement is a positive step, but Allan's immediate reaction is scepticism about the genre: the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership label has been applied so widely, and the China one has served so poorly, that the label itself carries little content. What matters is whether annual leaders' meetings actually happen, whether the relationship deepens in practice. "Labelling things is only a start, not a destination" is a maxim applicable far beyond bilateral diplomacy — it captures Allan's scepticism toward the performative gesture that substitutes for substance.

"Mutual respect is at the core of any effective diplomatic relationship"¶

"Mutual respect is at the core of any effective diplomatic relationship. And you really just have to think back to, you know, the last couple of years, there was a deployed criticism of Donald Trump, just to see that. We should certainly require respect from Beijing and agreement to speak to our ministers would be an excellent place for them to start. But we also do need to examine our own behaviour."

— [00:04:42.000 --> 00:05:57.320]

In the context of O'Connor's "show more respect" remark, which was widely interpreted as advocating subservience, Allan splits the difference: respect is indeed at the core of diplomacy (a practitioner's bedrock principle, not a talking point), but he insists on symmetry. Australia should require respect from Beijing as much as from Washington. The Trump reference is precise: the most persuasive evidence that disrespect in diplomacy is dangerous is the experience of watching an American president deploy it systematically. Allan applies the same standard to Australia's own behaviour — "we do need to examine our own behaviour" — not the on-the-record statements of the PM (which he calls "fine") but what is left unsaid and who is appointed to advisory bodies.

Biographical Fragments¶

Personal affection for Burma/Myanmar — "fantastic people"¶

Evidence: Ep067 [00:14:31.680]. "The Burmese who are fantastic people, but who have suffered under military regimes that were simultaneously repressive and incompetent since 1962." Confidence: High. First-person emotional register.

Allan's description of the Burmese as "fantastic people" is not a diplomatic formula but an affective statement rooted in direct experience — his first diplomatic posting was to Burma (1971–1974, tentative; confirmed Ep064). He spent two to three years in the country under Ne Win's military dictatorship. The emotional register here — "great sadness," "fantastic people," "on this wheel again" — is audibly different from his analytical commentary on other countries. He is not commenting on Myanmar from the outside; he is mourning the fate of a country he knew as a young man.

Speech-reading methodology made explicit¶

Evidence: Ep067 [00:26:29.840 --> 00:29:33.300]. Directly stated. Confidence: High.

Allan articulates his approach to reading political speeches: first the rhetoric, then the content. "I think, oh, that sounds really good. And then I look at the content." This is the reading order of a professional communicator who knows that effective rhetoric is itself evidence — it signals what the speaker wants audiences to feel, not just think. For Chinese leaders' speeches, he modifies the approach in two ways: (1) he treats them as authoritative (no internal politics to parse, the content represents "the one Chinese view"); (2) he cannot assess the rhetoric because the English translation removes it ("maybe win-win situation sounds better in Mandarin"). The acknowledgement of this limitation is unaffected.

Style and Method Evidence¶

De Maistre as setup for rejection: He deploys the aphorism not to endorse it but to establish the orthodox view before dismantling it. This is a characteristic rhetorical move — citing an authority as a foil.
The Australia-NZ structural analysis: The economically-confident/strategically-vulnerable vs. strategically-confident/economically-vulnerable formulation is crafted in real time — it appears complete and balanced, not groping. Allan arrives at clean binary contrasts when the underlying structure genuinely is binary; he does not force the contrast.
The Xi speech analysis: The observation that "large chunks of it... could have come from the stump speech of many Australian prime ministers" is methodologically important — he resists the reflexive "it's just propaganda" dismissal by asking what Chinese and Australian leaders' use of the same language implies about shared interests.
"On this wheel again": The wheel image (the wheel of fortune, cyclical suffering) applied to Burma is literary and precise. It suggests he has thought about Burma in these terms over decades.

Reading / Listening Segment¶

Seneca podcast — Michael Swaine, Jessica Lee, Rachel O'Dell on the Quincy Institute's East Asia strategy paper¶

Context: Prompted by Darren's discussion of the difficulty of finding "genuinely different prescriptions" for US policy in the region. Allan recommends a Seneca podcast episode featuring Michael Swaine, Jessica Lee, and Rachel O'Dell discussing a paper from the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft on a new US strategy for East Asia. Allan's verdict: "I don't agree with all their prescriptions, but one of the really interesting conclusions they draw is that if, as they recommend, the US moves to a military strategy of denial rather than control in East Asia, then Australia and forces based here become a much more important element in the strategic equation. So it's worth listening and pondering that." Note: The Quincy Institute is named for John Quincy Adams, whose dictum "America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy" is its founding principle. Allan supplies this etymology without prompting.

The recommendation is characteristic: he does not endorse the paper but flags the implication that matters to Australia. The Quincy Institute's denial-vs-control distinction has direct consequences for Australian strategic planning — if the US scales back offensive reach and relies more on denial, Australia's role in forward basing and ISR becomes more significant. This is the policy-relevance test he applies to any analytical work.

Open Questions¶

Burma posting depth: Allan says "the Burmese who are fantastic people" with genuine warmth. Beyond the administrative fact of the posting, what did he actually do in Burma? Are there other episodes where he speaks more directly about specific experiences or relationships from that posting?
De Maistre reference: Allan describes him as "18th century French philosopher and diplomat." Is this a figure he references elsewhere in the corpus, or a one-off deployment?
Malaysia CSP scepticism: Allan hopes the Malaysia CSP "does better than its Chinese counterpart." Does the corpus show him returning to this assessment as events develop?