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Source — AITW Ep053 — Consulate Closures & Deteriorating US-China Relations; AUSMIN; Defence Strategic Update

Episode Metadata

Field Value
Episode number 53
Title Consulate closures & deteriorating US-China relations; AUSMIN; Defence Strategic Update
Publication date 2020-08-05
Recording date Monday, 3 August 2020 (Darren: "It's Monday the 3rd of August today")
Guests None — Allan and Darren only
Allan present Yes
Format Regular discussion — three topics

Summary

Three topics: (1) the accelerating US-China deterioration — consulate closures (Houston/Chengdu), Pompeo's "free world must triumph" speech, decoupling; (2) AUSMIN 2020, held in person despite COVID; (3) the Defence Strategic Update (1 July 2020) alongside announced DFAT budget cuts. The central analytical debate in the episode is the defence-vs-diplomacy false binary, which Allan refuses to accept: "I just don't see that clear distinction." His preferred historical parallel for the current strategic environment is pre-1914 rather than the 1930s that Morrison favoured — a more precise and more alarming choice. Notable personal disclosure: "I can remember the animosity and fear that still marked Australian attitudes towards Japan during my boyhood." Reading segment: Allan recommends the AIIA's new "Week in Australian Foreign Policy" feature on Australian Outlook; Darren recommends Taylor Swift's Folklore.

Key Quotations

"I worry more about the period before 1914 than the 1930s"

"In terms of preferred historical parallels, I worry more about the period before 1914 than the 1930s that he [Morrison] pointed to."

— [00:34:25.670 --> 00:36:34.270]

A significant historiographical choice. Morrison's preferred parallel is the 1930s, which frames the strategic problem as: there is a clear aggressor that must be deterred before it is too late. Allan's preferred parallel is pre-1914, which frames the problem differently: the danger is miscalculation and entanglement, great powers stumbling into conflict that none of them intended, through alliance commitments and escalating signals. The pre-1914 framing is actually more pessimistic in one sense — it implies the risk of catastrophe even in the absence of clear malicious intent. It is also more analytically nuanced. The one-word substitution does a great deal of work: not "I prefer" but "I worry" — a calibrated verb that carries the weight of a genuine assessment.

"Nothing, nothing like that now"

"Just two years ago, with the same governments in both countries, the AUSMIN communique noted that both Australia and the United States 'continue to place a high priority on constructive and beneficial engagement with China.' Nothing, nothing like that now."

— [00:24:43.070 --> 00:25:33.970]

The double "nothing" is unusual — Allan is not given to repetition for rhetorical effect; this is the mark of genuine emphasis. He is placing a measurable two-year change on record. The 2018 AUSMIN communique used language of constructive engagement; the 2020 communique cannot. He has read both documents; the comparison is precise. One of the stronger statements on the pace of strategic deterioration in the corpus.

"Diplomacy is foreign policy's operating system"

"Expenditure on foreign policy and diplomacy, which is foreign policy's operating system, provides us with the knowledge and tools required to persuade others."

— [00:40:31.770 --> 00:41:58.970]

A variant of his Ep046 distinction ("foreign policy is the objective, diplomacy is the mechanism"). Here he deploys "operating system" — a software metaphor — rather than "mechanism." The metaphor is more evocative: an operating system is what runs underneath every application; if it degrades, everything built on it degrades too. The context is his rejection of the defence-vs-diplomacy binary: "I just don't see that clear distinction." Foreign policy and diplomacy are not competitors for the same budget; they are the enabling infrastructure for every other instrument of statecraft including defence.

"Viruses and the biosphere are not susceptible to deterrence, only to coordinated action"

"Last time we were reviewing the latest Lowy poll, we noted that Australians are even more concerned about non-traditional security threats, including pandemics and climate change, and viruses and the biosphere are not susceptible to deterrence, only to coordinated action. And that's where diplomacy comes in again."

— [00:43:20.770 --> 00:44:03.770]

Nine words encapsulating the structural argument for diplomacy that cannot be made by a defence procurement schedule. The formulation is exact: deterrence is the threat of retaliation, which requires an adversary capable of being deterred. Viruses and the biosphere have no decision-making apparatus to target. The only mechanism available is coordinated action — which requires diplomatic infrastructure. Delivered as a closing argument after the devil's advocate exchange; characteristically, he does not over-elaborate.

"I can remember the animosity and fear that still marked Australian attitudes towards Japan during my boyhood"

"Even in my own lifetime, I can remember the animosity and fear that still marked Australian attitudes towards Japan during my boyhood. So, I do think the development of the relationship with Japan has been one of the outstanding achievements of Australian foreign policy over 50 years."

— [00:29:01.070 --> 00:30:07.970]

A rare personal disclosure as historical witness. Born in 1948, Allan's boyhood was the 1950s and early 1960s — WWII had ended only a few years before his conscious memory began. Anti-Japanese sentiment in Australian homes, media, and public life was real and vivid in those years. He invokes this memory not as grievance but as contrast: the transformation from that animosity to Japan being Australia's "closest friend in Asia" (Rory Medcalf's phrase) is one of "the outstanding achievements of Australian foreign policy over 50 years." He is measuring the achievement against the baseline he actually lived.

"We lucked out in the 2017 foreign policy white paper"

"I think we lucked out in the 2017 foreign policy white paper. I think it came at the right moment. It was written by the right people and it gave us a framework which has endured."

— [00:33:19.870 --> 00:33:49.070]

"Lucked out" is unusually candid — he is acknowledging that timing and personnel combined favourably, rather than taking full credit for the White Paper's durability. He immediately specifies why: the right moment, the right people, a framework that has endured. The combination of luck and quality is the acknowledgement. He then says it would be "enormously difficult" to do the same now, because COVID has changed the world "in directions which are absolutely not clear."

Biographical Fragments

Evidence type: Corroborating / New

  1. Anti-Japan sentiment in Allan's boyhood: "Even in my own lifetime, I can remember the animosity and fear that still marked Australian attitudes towards Japan during my boyhood." Born 1948; boyhood = mid-1950s to early 1960s, when WWII memories were still vivid in Australian households and public culture. He uses this as a baseline against which to measure the transformation of the Australia-Japan relationship as a "outstanding achievement." (Ep053)

  2. AIIA "Week in Australian Foreign Policy" initiative launched: During the podcast period, the AIIA launched a new regular feature on its Australian Outlook blog, curating and linking to the week's major foreign policy statements by ministers, departments, opposition spokespeople. First compiler: intern Isabella Keith. Reflects Allan's role as AIIA National President building the institute's public education function during the COVID period. (Ep053)

Style and Method Evidence

  • Refusing the defence-vs-diplomacy binary: "I just don't see that clear distinction." Allan consistently refuses offered trade-off framings when the two sides are not actually in competition. Foreign policy is the operating system; defence is one application. Cutting the OS to fund the application is incoherent, not a trade-off.
  • Pre-1914 vs 1930s as historical parallel: He identifies Morrison's preferred parallel (1930s), names it, and explicitly substitutes his own (pre-1914). This is not pedantry — it is a material disagreement about the nature of the risk. The 1930s parallel implies a deterrence solution; pre-1914 implies a miscalculation/entanglement risk that deterrence might actually worsen.
  • "Nothing, nothing like that now": The one instance of deliberate repetition for emphasis in this episode. Signals that the contrast he is drawing is not rhetorical but empirical — he has read both documents.
  • "The increase in the ADF... alone is about the size of the entire Australian diplomatic service": A single comparative statistic used as a concluding argument. No elaboration needed; the number does the work.

Reading / Listening Segment

Allan: Recommends the AIIA's new "Week in Australian Foreign Policy" feature on its Australian Outlook blog — direct links to important foreign policy statements by ministers, departments, and opposition spokespeople. First compiler: intern Isabella Keith. Not a personal cultural recommendation but an institutional service announcement.

Darren: Taylor Swift — Folklore (2020). Recommends it to Allan on the basis that Aaron Dessner of The National (whom Allan recommended in Ep020) co-wrote and produced more than half the songs. Also notes a duet with Justin Vernon (Bon Iver). "Perfect winter listening by the fire amid the terror of a global pandemic." Allan: "You have convinced me to check it out immediately after this."

Note: The Taylor Swift recommendation comes from Darren, not Allan. Allan expresses willingness to listen, not an endorsement. Not added to Allan's preferences page.

Open Questions

  1. Does Allan's pre-1914 preference over 1930s appear in his written work? It is a distinctive historiographical claim worth tracing across the corpus and his publications.
  2. The AUSMIN communique language on China — has he written about the 2018-to-2020 shift elsewhere?
  3. The ADF increase equalling "the size of the entire Australian diplomatic service" — is this a figure he cites from a published source or a calculation he made himself? If the former, what source?
  4. What was Allan's specific boyhood experience of anti-Japanese sentiment — is there any more detail elsewhere in the corpus?