Source — AITW Ep084 — AUKUS Revisited; Quad Leaders; China & CPTPP; Taiwan¶

Episode Metadata¶

Field	Value
Episode number	84
Title	Ep. 84: AUKUS revisited; Quad leaders; China & CPTPP; Taiwan
Publication date	2021-10-08
Recording date	Thursday, 7 October 2021
Guests	None (Allan and Darren only)
Allan present	Yes
Format	Four topics: AUKUS revisited (three weeks on); Quad leaders' first in-person summit; China's CPTPP application juxtaposed with US Trade Representative Tai speech; Taiwan ADIZ activity. Reading segment.

Summary¶

Three weeks after AUKUS, neither host has changed their fundamental position, but both find the complexity of what lies ahead has grown in their minds. The episode's most revealing material is Allan's extended reflection on Paul Keating — drawn from his time inside Keating's office — which he uses to argue that Keating's AUKUS op-ed should be read as political communication, not foreign policy analysis. The distinction is genuine and practitioner-precise: politicians shift the frame of public debate and give permission to speak; analysts develop policy. Both jobs are necessary; confusing them is the error.

Allan's AUKUS critique sharpens on two new points: the APS resource cost (the 18-month implementation process "will consume enormous amounts of the resources of the Australian Public Service") and the foreign policy vacuum (nuclear submarines "in 2040 are not much help against concerns about coercion or adherence to the rules-based order right now"). He cites David Sanger — reading a podcast transcript that morning — as direct evidence of Washington's framing: the deal would "enable the United States to bring the submarines right up along the Chinese coast." He treats this not as alarmism but as confirmation of the integration point from Ep083.

The Quad summit is assessed with characteristic scepticism about rhetorical overreach: "rhetorical overreach can weaken rather than strengthen a helpful asset for Australia. I believe that the most effective communication is letting these developments speak for themselves." On China's CPTPP bid, he returns to his "all of the above" analytical reflex rather than committing to a single reading. On Taiwan, he is careful and precise — distinguishing the ADIZ from Taiwanese airspace and explicitly ruling out imminent military action.

Key Quotations¶

"A blare of trumpets, but very little precision"¶

"My major concern from the beginning was the way in which the announcement came wrapped up in so many different issues and in such a non-specific way. So we got it with a blare of trumpets, but very little precision."

— [00:01:19.120 --> 00:04:17.120]

Three weeks on and the broadness of the announcement remains the first complaint. "Blare of trumpets" is deliberate anti-flourish — the ceremonial noise distracts from the absence of specifics. Allan's approach throughout: announcements should be accountable to their actual content.

"No in principle objection" — but not without debate¶

"I have no in principle objection to Australia buying nuclear submarines, I can easily see the advantages. But I have a real objection to our doing it without a well informed public debate, including about whether the functions they will be able to serve are those we're going to need in 40 years time."

— [00:01:19.120 --> 00:04:17.120]

Allan clarifies the nature of his objection. He is not against nuclear submarines per se; he is against committing to a $100 billion purchase without proper public deliberation about the 40-year requirement. The distinction matters: critics of his position had framed it as objection-in-principle. Here he corrects the record.

"$100 billion — I repeat $100 billion"¶

"Whether this is the best way of spending around $100 billion, I repeat $100 billion, which is a national expenditure worth thinking about."

— [00:01:19.120 --> 00:04:17.120]

The repetition is deliberate emphasis. Allan rarely uses this technique; its appearance here signals genuine exasperation at what he perceives as a national commitment being made without adequate cost scrutiny. "Worth thinking about" is understatement as rebuke.

David Sanger — "bring the submarines right up along the Chinese coast"¶

"Yesterday morning to an American podcast featuring David Sanger, the very well-connected New York Times national security correspondent. He was talking about the submarine deal with Australia, and he said approvingly, and I quote him, that would enable the United States to bring the submarines right up along the Chinese coast. Maybe Sanger was using these words loosely, but I'm certain there's a widely held view in Washington that the assets available to the US in a conflict with China have just been substantially strengthened, at least prospectively."

— [00:06:16.000 --> 00:07:55.240]

Allan has been monitoring US commentary that morning and goes straight to a primary source. Sanger is explicitly characterised as "very well-connected" — this is not fringe analysis but mainstream Washington security commentary. The conditional ("maybe Sanger was using these words loosely") is characteristic epistemic care; the conclusion that follows it is not conditional. The implication is that Australian submarines will be operationally integrated into US strategy in the Pacific, confirming his "subsidiary of the United States Navy" framing from Ep083.

Foreign policy — "not much help against concerns about coercion right now"¶

"My other continuing problem with this... is the absence of a place for foreign policy as part of this development. There's zero more evidence now that foreign policy advice played much of a role in the way this was developed... nuclear submarines in 2040 are not much help against concerns about coercion or adherence to the rules-based order right now. That's mostly in the domain of foreign policy."

— [00:08:06.360 --> 00:09:50.280]

One of his clearest statements of the foreign policy–defence policy distinction in the AUKUS context. The timeline asymmetry is the analytical payload: the coercion Australia faces now (trade pressure, diplomatic freeze, rules-based order erosion) is a foreign policy problem that submarines decades away cannot address. Connects to his broader argument that Australian policy has collapsed foreign policy into defence policy (Ep066: "that's part of our problem").

APS resources consumed — the implementation cost¶

"The job of working out over the next 18 months, whether and how nuclear submarines might operate, is going to consume enormous amounts of the resources of the Australian Public Service. It will impact particularly on defence, of course, but on DFAT and other departments as well. So adding to the acknowledged complexity of the international environment at the moment, many of the best human resources in the Australian Public Service are going to be taken up with this task. Now, that's necessary. I accept that. But it is going to make Australia's capacity to navigate and handle the world even harder."

— [00:08:06.360 --> 00:09:50.280]

An opportunity cost argument that had been absent from the public debate to this point. The APS has finite capacity; a complex 18-month study of unprecedented defence procurement will draw human capital away from every other foreign and strategic policy task. "That's necessary. I accept that." — characteristic fairness to the opposition; he does not pretend the review is avoidable, only that its cost must be acknowledged.

Turnbull on Morrison — "deliberately deceived France"¶

"He says, Mr. Morrison has not acted in good faith. He deliberately deceived France. He doesn't want to say it was in Australia's national interest. So is that Mr. Morrison's ethical standard with which Australia is now to be tagged? Australia will act honestly, unless it is judged in our national interest to deceive. So, you know, this is a former Prime Minister talking about his successor from the same political party. He's brutal, but probably not unfair in his assessment."

— [00:13:30.720 --> 00:15:18.440]

Allan is quoting Turnbull, but the endorsement — "brutal, but probably not unfair" — is his own. He attributes "deliberate deception" to Morrison via Turnbull's formulation rather than asserting it directly, which is epistemically precise: Turnbull was in the room; Allan was not. He does add his own gloss that Turnbull is partly motivated by defending his own government's French submarine decision.

Keating as politician, not analyst¶

"One of the things I learned from working in Paul Keating's office, which you would think would be obvious but isn't, is that the job of politicians is different from yours and mine... doing politics is vital to any democracy, and it's different from the job of analyzing problems or developing policy. At least one of the jobs of politicians is to shift the frame of public reference in order to broaden the debate and engage different participants in the discussion. Politicians give permission to speak, if you like, to the voters at large. So that's how I read this article and his earlier statements, not as a careful analysis of the appropriate response to China's actions at this time."

— [00:19:29.980 --> 00:22:14.760]

The most direct account in the corpus of what Allan learned from working inside a prime ministerial office. The lesson is about institutional roles: politicians are not analysts operating in the wrong medium; they are performing a different function that analysis cannot perform. "Politicians give permission to speak" — this is a precise institutional claim: when a former PM makes a bold public argument, it licenses ordinary citizens to voice similar doubts. Allan does not say Keating is right or wrong; he says Keating is doing something other than what critics expect.

Keating's banana republic — "I don't think he literally believed that"¶

"I saw Keating's op-ed in the same category as his famous claim back in the 1980s that Australia was about to become a banana republic. I don't think he literally believed that was true, but the debate that followed was an essential part of the reforms that the Hawke Keating government introduced."

— [00:19:29.980 --> 00:22:14.760]

Historical contextualisation of Keating's rhetorical method. The banana republic formulation is being used as a precedent, not an insult. Allan's reading — that Keating uses extreme language to open space for debate, not as literal analysis — is both sympathetic and politically sophisticated. It also reflects Allan's own analytical position: he takes Keating's rhetorical moves seriously without taking them literally.

Heart in mouth — inside Keating's press conferences¶

"Any of the staffers who worked with Paul Keating could recognize the familiar sensation of standing on the sidelines of a press conference or sitting in a meeting with a foreign leader with your heart in your mouth and saying to yourself, Oh, God, no, you can't say what I think you are about to say. And then he would."

— [00:19:29.980 --> 00:22:14.760]

One of the most vivid and personal passages in the corpus. Allan is placing himself among "the staffers" in Keating's press conferences and bilateral meetings with foreign leaders — a direct biographical confirmation of his presence at those moments. The "heart in mouth" is delivered as shared professional experience, not anecdote; it invites listeners who have been in similar situations to recognise the sensation. The closing "And then he would" is perfectly timed: the short sentence does all the work of the entire episode's Keating analysis in three words.

Quad — "letting these developments speak for themselves"¶

"The rhetorical pitch just seems out of whack with the underlying reality... rhetorical overreach can weaken rather than strengthen a helpful asset for Australia. I believe that the most effective communication is letting these developments speak for themselves."

— [00:23:34.600 --> 00:25:04.000]

A consistent position across the corpus: inflated language undermines the credibility of real achievements. The Quad communiqué's "ambitious and far-reaching vision" language is analysed and found wanting because it names no concrete shared vision beyond China-opposition. Allan states a principle of political communication — not just criticism of this communiqué but a general maxim. Connects to "hyperventilation" (Ep008), "squibbed it at the end" (Ep023), and his general anti-overreach positions throughout.

CPTPP — "it could be any of the above"¶

"Was it a conciliatory sign that China wants to mend economic tensions with its neighbors? Was it a cynical message underlining America's political stalemate on trade reform? We can do this, but they can't. Was it a response to knowledge that Taiwan was going to apply and a determination to ensure that its own strong views were factored into that? Now, it could be any of the above, and I really don't know."

— [00:27:39.400 --> 00:29:26.680]

The "all of the above" analytical reflex, applied to China's CPTPP application. Allan's epistemic honesty here is calibrated: he does not pretend to decode Beijing's strategic calculus. Three distinct explanations are offered — conciliatory, cynical, tactical — each is plausible; he genuinely does not know which is dominant. Characteristic: "I really don't know" is not a dodge but an honest assessment of his epistemic limits on this question.

"Oh, come on, Darren — no more observing fascinating questions"¶

"Oh, come on, Darren, no more observing fascinating questions. Look, there's a pressing and imminent policy question for Australia here. How should the government respond?"

— [00:31:45.480 --> 00:31:58.520]

Characteristic impatience with intellectual comfort-seeking. Darren has framed the CPTPP strategic-vs-economic question as "fascinating." Allan's rebuke is gentle but direct: the point of analysis is to arrive at a policy response, not to admire the complexity. Connects to his practitioner identity throughout — he treats foreign policy problems as action-requiring, not merely interesting.

Taiwan ADIZ — not the same as airspace¶

"It's important to understand that this is not the same thing as its airspace. And so far, there are no reports of Chinese incursions into the airspace itself... I don't think it's a sign of imminent Chinese action across the straits, as has been implied in some of the reporting at least."

— [00:39:30.920 --> 00:40:47.400]

Precise technical correction before analysis. Allan insists on the ADIZ/airspace distinction because conflating them inflates the threat assessment. He does not dismiss the seriousness of the incursions; he contextualises them correctly. "As has been implied in some of the reporting at least" — his standard hedge when distinguishing his view from media coverage. The conclusion — not imminent military action — is stated plainly and without qualification.

Biographical Fragments¶

Evidence type: Reinforcing (confirming known career facts)

Inside Keating's press conferences and foreign leader meetings — "standing on the sidelines of a press conference or sitting in a meeting with a foreign leader" — direct confirmation that Allan was physically present at Keating's bilateral meetings with foreign leaders and at press conferences. Consistent with working in PM's office (confirmed Ep014) but provides the detail of his physical proximity during high-stakes moments. (Ep084)
Learned a specific lesson from Keating's office — "one of the things I learned from working in Paul Keating's office, which you would think would be obvious but isn't" — frames his understanding of politician-vs-analyst roles as experiential learning, not theoretical. This kind of learning-from-proximity attribution appears rarely and is significant when it does. (Ep084)

Style and Method Evidence¶

Primary source monitoring: reads a David Sanger podcast transcript "yesterday morning" before recording — the same morning habit as the 92-laws statistic (Ep082) and the Brookings civil-war piece (Ep083).
"I repeat $100 billion": rare repetition technique, used to force emphasis where he believes the number is being glossed over.
Institutional role taxonomy: politician vs analyst is stated as a lesson learned, not a theoretical distinction. Allan inhabits both worlds; the taxonomy comes from lived experience.
"That's necessary. I accept that." — characteristic fairness move: grants the strongest concession available to the opposition before making his own point. Used to prevent his objections from being misread as objections-in-principle.
"I really don't know" on CPTPP: epistemic honesty deployed on a question where confident analysis would be possible but unwarranted.
Anti-overreach principle: "the most effective communication is letting these developments speak for themselves" — stated as a general maxim, not just this instance.

Reading, Listening and Watching¶

Allan — 9/11: Inside the President's War Room (Apple TV documentary)

"I have to say, I came away from it with a greater respect for the president and somewhat less for some of the people around him. But above all, it's a classic study in the management of any crisis where details are unclear and sometimes conflicting and messages get distorted in the passing. I hadn't realized just how blind even the most powerful state in the world was on that day."

— [00:43:40.280 --> 00:44:57.000]

The recommendation is made through the lens of crisis management analysis, not historical interest alone. Allan distinguishes Bush (greater respect) from some advisors (less) without naming the latter — characteristic precision about what the evidence supports. "Classic study in the management of any crisis" is Allan's highest practical genre: how institutions and individuals perform under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Compare his praise for Neustadt and May's Thinking in Time (Ep026) — another study in how decision-makers use and misuse information under pressure.

Open Questions¶

Does Allan return to the Keating politician-vs-analyst distinction in later episodes, particularly as Keating continues to comment on China and AUKUS through 2022?
The "heart in mouth" at Keating's bilateral meetings — does the corpus contain any other references that might identify specific meetings Allan was present at?
Allan says "I think I said first on this podcast... that his foreign policy for the middle class looked very like Donald Trump's America first, but with better manners." This formulation was first used in Ep060. Does he continue deploying it as Biden's term progresses?
Does Allan's assessment of Taiwan ADIZ activity ("not a sign of imminent Chinese action") hold up or get revised as the Taiwan situation intensifies in Ep101?
The APS resource cost argument — does it reappear in later episodes as a concrete consequence of AUKUS becomes more visible?